United Nations S/PV.6368

Security Council

Sixty-fifth year

Provisional

6368th meeting

Wednesday, 4 August 2010, 10 a.m.

New York

President:	Mr. Churkin	(Russian Federation)
Members:	Austria	Mr. Lutterotti
	Bosnia and Herzegovina	Mr. Barbalić
	Brazil	Mrs. Dunlop
	China	Mr. Long Zhou
	France	Mr. De Rivière
	Gabon	Mr. Moungara Moussotsi
	Japan	Mr. Sumi
	Lebanon	Ms. Ziade
	Mexico	Mr. Heller
	Nigeria	Mr. Onemola
	Turkey	Mr. Apakan
	Uganda	Mr. Mugoya
	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	Mr. Parham
	United States of America	Ms. DiCarlo

Agenda

The situation concerning Iraq

Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 6 of resolution 1883 (2009) (S/2010/406)

Note verbale dated 28 July 2010 from the Permanent Mission of Iraq to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (S/2010/404)

This record contains the text of speeches delivered in English and of the interpretation of speeches delivered in the other languages. The final text will be printed in the *Official Records of the Security Council*. Corrections should be submitted to the original languages only. They should be incorporated in a copy of the record and sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned to the Chief of the Verbatim Reporting Service, room U-506.

10-47406 (E)

Please recycle

The meeting was called to order at 10.05 a.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

The situation concerning Iraq

Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 6 of resolution 1883 (2009) (S/2010/406)

Note verbale dated 28 July 2010 from the Permanent Mission of Iraq to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (S/2010/404)

The President (*spoke in Russian*): I should like to inform the Council that I have received a letter from the representative of Iraq, in which he requests to be invited to participate in the consideration of the item on the Council's agenda. In conformity with the usual practice, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite that representative to participate in the consideration of the item, without the right to vote, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure.

There being no objection, it is so decided.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Al Bayati (Iraq) took a seat at the Council table.

The President (*spoke in Russian*): In accordance with the understanding reached in the Council's prior consultations, I shall take it that the Security Council agrees to extend an invitation under rule 39 of its provisional rules of procedure to Mr. Ad Melkert, Special Representative of the Secretary-General and head of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq.

It is so decided.

I invite Mr. Melkert to take a seat at the Council table.

The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. The Council is meeting in accordance with the understanding reached in its prior consultations.

I wish to draw the attention of members to document S/2010/406, containing the report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 6 of resolution 1883 (2009). I also wish to draw the attention of members to document S/2010/404, containing a note verbale dated 28 July 2010 from the Permanent Mission of Iraq to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General.

At this meeting, the Council will hear a briefing by Mr. Ad Melkert, to whom I now give the floor.

Mr. Melkert: I welcome the opportunity to brief the Security Council today on the challenges facing Iraq and on the role of the United Nations. As the Security Council considers the renewal of the mandate of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), I wish to reiterate the Secretary-General's personal commitment to see the United Nations continue to implement its mandate and assist the people and the Government of Iraq to build a sustainable and prosperous future. During the past year, my team and I have been working with our Iraqi counterparts in a range of areas that are vital for Iraq's future. While notable progress has been made, major tasks are still ahead.

Following the successful completion of the parliamentary elections on 7 March 2010 and the certification of the election results on 2 June, Iraq has reached a critical juncture. Despite several months of negotiations, the transition to a new Government is still pending. As stated in the Secretary-General's report before the Council (S/2010/406), persistent delays in the Government formation process are contributing to uncertainty in the country and creating conditions that could be exploited by elements opposed to Iraq's democratic transition.

This process represents a real test of Iraq's transition to democracy and the commitment of Iraqi leaders to adhering to the country's Constitution. Continuing disagreements over who has the right to form the next Government and the appointment to key posts persist. It is too early to speak of an impasse, as some do, yet this cannot be excluded as a risk. There have been some encouraging signs. The main political blocs appear to agree on the need for a partnership Government and have been discussing possible power-sharing arrangements. I believe that, at this stage, Government formation could benefit from adherence to a specific time frame, as well as a collective process through which a resolution could be reached.

While negotiations continue, attention must be paid to the business of governing during this period. Last week, a common understanding seems to have

evolved among all political blocs over whether, indeed, the stage of a caretaker Government has been reached. While this is an issue for Iraqis to decide upon themselves, the concern is that a prolonged delay could impact on the day-to-day business of governing and could affect all walks of Iraqi life.

It is well understood that the Government formation process is a sovereign process and the full responsibility of Iraqis themselves. For its part, UNAMI continues to meet and listen to all parties concerned and stands ready to provide assistance and support at their request.

It is indeed the enfranchisement of the voters that now matters most. I therefore reiterate the Secretary-General's call in the report for Iraqi leaders to show a higher sense of urgency and to work together to forge an agreement through an inclusive process, without further delays caused by either domestically or externally generated considerations. There is no reason to be pessimistic as yet, for Iraq has embarked on an historic path that will shape the future of the country. However, the onus is ultimately on Iraqi leaders to ensure an orderly and peaceful transition of power. This is owed to the people of Iraq and expected by the international community.

Further delays in the formation of a Government are also impacting on the country's basic infrastructure and services, affecting the livelihood and well-being of Iraqi citizens. Recent protests in a number of cities denouncing the lack of electricity are a sign of potentially growing disillusionment and anger over what has become a situation of daily life for the average Iraqi citizen. The supply of electricity is at about 67 per cent of peak demand, with periods of blackout still averaging more than nine hours per day nationally. The Government has made electricity production a priority. Shortages will take several years to overcome, meanwhile negatively affecting prospects for employment and economic growth.

In furtherance of identifying the development agenda, on 26 July I chaired the Global Open Day for Women and Peace, in celebration of the tenth anniversary of resolution 1325 (2000), in Iraq. The meeting, widely attended by women parliamentarians and civil society leaders, called for wide-ranging legal reform, technical support for reconciliation and advocacy for gender equality.

With the National Development Plan as a basis, the Government has set its priorities to address features of underdevelopment in a country with such rich resources. Yet political delays stand in the way of appointments, mandates and capacity-building. After the signing of the United Nations Development Assistance Framework, many United Nations agencies are preparing for their part in the international technical assistance and advice that should accelerate progress on the ground.

I must, however, express a word of concern on the less than clear strategic involvement of the international community in its support for Iraq. Recently, the Humanitarian Coordinator appealed to donors "not to give up their commitment to the Iraqi people", as only 12 per cent of the required $187 million sought for the 2010 Humanitarian Action Plan for Iraq had been received. Clearly, contributions from Iraq's national budget should provide the lion's share for development and humanitarian action in the future. However, that will still take time, and time is not on the side of Iraqis who require significant support right now.

Once the Government formation process has been completed, it is imperative that Iraqi leaders continue to make national reconciliation a priority and address the many outstanding political and constitutional challenges facing the country. This includes Arab-Kurdish relations, particularly as they relate to disputed internal boundaries, revenue-sharing, legislation related to hydrocarbons, the federal framework and the constitutional review process. One area that I am pleased to report on is our serious efforts to promote dialogue in Ninewa governorate.

Following last year's initiative by Deputy Prime Minister al-Issawi, UNAMI has continued to support efforts to achieve progress in relation to Ninewa residents currently in detention in the Kurdistan region. Additionally, as part of this process a forum has been created for Ninewa's various minority communities to come together to identify ways to protect their rights. Central to the discussion in Ninewa is the handling of security arrangements between the Government of Iraq and Kurdistan regional security forces. The trilateral combined security agreement between the federal security forces, the Kurdistan Regional Government security forces, and the United States Forces in Iraq that currently operate in the disputed areas has made significant progress towards confronting instability in

these areas. Efforts to establish clear and sustainable security arrangements for the years ahead remain vital.

It is my hope that the process to end the boycott of the Ninewa Provincial Council will gain momentum, particularly as clarity and progress are achieved on some of the efforts just outlined. It is also hoped that the Ninewa talks will create a positive atmosphere for addressing the issue of disputed internal boundaries and improving relations between Arabs and Kurds.

Concerning Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter and relations with Kuwait, I should like to refer to my visit on 20 June to Kuwait, as well as various informal exchanges, which have confirmed that the time has come for a serious concerted effort to draw outstanding issues to a close. With the new Ambassador of Iraq having arrived in Kuwait, conditions for a results-oriented dialogue have improved. Entering an era of good-neighbourliness would serve as the necessary response to relevant Security Council resolutions, in particular resolution 833 (1993), and at the same time be of great mutual benefit for trade and development.

Once the formation process is complete, it is essential that the new Government move quickly to fulfil Iraq's outstanding obligations under Chapter VII resolutions, which are necessary for Iraq to achieve international standing equal to that which it held prior to the adoption of these resolutions. I hope that the actions taken by the new Government in this regard will create a new momentum for the Secretary-General's report pursuant to resolution 1859 (2008), which was submitted last July and remains pending with the Security Council. UNAMI continues its work to assist parties in this endeavour.

In a climate of uncertainty and volatility, UNAMI and the United Nations country team continue to work on the basis of their respective mandates in order to provide to the Government and people of Iraq, at their request, the kind of support that will contribute to stability, investments and long-term development.

I should inform the Council that the practical implications of the United States military drawdown are now starting to have an impact on our operations. We have engaged with the Government of Iraq to ensure that the conditions for the future United Nations presence in the country are on a secure and sustainable foundation, which will require finalization of the United Nations-Iraq status of mission agreement and an increase in the Organization's own security and operational capacity encompassing aviation, transport, infrastructure and life support.

I must stress that, in order to keep the United Nations presence at current or even higher levels, adequate financial resources from Member States will inevitably be required. I call upon the Council to weigh the implications of this particular period of transition as part of its consideration of the extension of the UNAMI mandate. I would like to remind the Council that a great number of United Nations staff members are still operating under challenging working and living conditions. A clear signal of ongoing commitment and support is critical to all those who are dedicating themselves to helping the Iraqi people build a peaceful and prosperous country.

In conclusion, Iraq has made considerable progress since 2003. It has come a long way in consolidating its peace and security and promoting the welfare of its citizens. Nevertheless, we cannot underestimate the challenges that it still faces. It is essential that the Security Council and the international community as a whole do their utmost to ensure that all necessary support continues to be provided to Iraq until such time that it can reach its full potential. I wish to assure the Council that the Secretary-General and UNAMI will endeavour to implement whatever new mandate the Security Council establishes, working for the benefit of the people of Iraq.

The President (*spoke in Russian*): I thank Mr. Melkert for his briefing.

I now give the floor to the Permanent Representative of Iraq.

Mr. Al Bayati (Iraq): Mr. President, allow me at the outset to congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council for this month. I would also like to present our thanks to your predecessor, Her Excellency Mrs. Joy Ogwu, Permanent Representative of Nigeria, for her distinguished efforts during her presidency in the month of July. Our thanks also go to Mr. Ad Melkert, Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Iraq, and his team in Baghdad and in New York for their vigorous efforts in assisting the Iraqi Government and the Iraqi people.

The past year has witnessed a substantial drop in violence and a manifest improvement of the security

situation in Iraq, despite some terrorist acts targeting innocent civilians. With the implementation of a bilateral agreement on the withdrawal of United States combat troops from Iraq, Iraqi security forces, despite some challenges they face, are assuming full responsibility for securing the country and have undeniably shown their ability to manage the security of Iraq by carrying out powerful strikes against terrorists and through law enforcement, regardless of partisan, ethnic or sectarian considerations.

This year has also witnessed the successful holding of legislative elections, which took place on 7 March and elicited considerable Arab, regional and international attention. Monitors from the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), the Organization of the Islamic Conference and the League of Arab States, in addition to international observers and civil society organizations, have all expressed their confidence in the transparent and fair elections held in Iraq.

The announcement of the election results was delayed by the constitutionally mandated ratification procedure, which entailed a recount of votes in accordance with electoral law and regulations. We were able to get beyond this stage because we referred the Constitution and a decision of the Independent Electoral Commission.

All of the major political parties are currently making extensive contacts in order to hold a fruitful session of the newly elected Council of Representatives, which will elect a new Speaker of the Council and the President and will then ask the new Prime Minister to form a Government based on the provisions of the Iraqi Constitution. We hope, and all parties have agreed, that this new Government will be formed without delay, as any delay will negatively affect the security situation.

The improvement of the security situation in Iraq has encouraged many Arab and foreign countries to reopen their diplomatic missions and has significantly contributed to the development of Iraq's friendly relations at the regional and international levels, in addition to the appointment of 53 Iraqi ambassadors to various countries of the world that have expressed their support for this development. Moreover, the chairmanship of Iraq at the Arab Summit next year will highlight Iraq's endeavours to become an effective and responsible member of the Arab world and the international community. Iraq will continue to strengthen its friendship ties and cooperation with its neighbours in order to regain its positive position among them, living peacefully with its people and its neighbours and reinforcing stability and security in the region.

In the development field, on 4 July the Iraqi Government launched a five-year National Development Plan 2010-2014, which includes approximately 2,700 strategic projects in various sectors valued at $186 billion, in order to develop the Iraqi economy and improve the quality of services provided to Iraqis. The implementation of this plan will provide 4 million jobs in order to address the problem of unemployment in Iraq.

The most important issue that Iraq faces at this stage remains freeing itself from the burden of Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. Pursuant to the report of the Secretary-General contained in document S/2009/385, it became clear to us that we would have to follow two courses of action. The first deals with issues concerning the situation in Iraq. The second deals with issues concerning the situation between Iraq and Kuwait.

Because of the importance and sensitivity of the latter, there has been a common understanding among all relevant parties, including our brothers in Kuwait, that this path would be considered after the formation of the new Iraqi Government. We earnestly hope that movement on this path will be in consultation and coordination with our Kuwaiti brothers in accordance with the relevant Security Council resolutions. In this regard, I wish to stress once again that Iraq is committed to the implementation of all Security Council resolutions without exception.

With regard to the first course of action, there are three key issues: the remaining issues of disarmament, particularly those relating to resolutions 687 (1991) and 707 (1991), the remaining contracts of the oil-for-food programme, and the issue of the protection of Iraqi funds. I will talk about what we have done in this process with transparency and high credibility.

With regard to the remaining issues of disarmament, after the Security Council adopted resolution 1762 (2007) in order to terminate the mandates of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) under the

relevant resolutions, we had to pursue the remaining issues in this area based on the aforementioned report of the Secretary-General. On this basis, on 18 January 2010, we sent a letter to the President of the Security Council and the Director General of IAEA, which explained all of the steps we have taken, as well as the steps we plan to take in this area.

We came to the conclusion that Iraq had fulfilled its obligations and requested the Security Council to consider the immediate lifting of all restrictions imposed on Iraq under the Security Council resolutions on disarmament and weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, including resolutions 687 (1991) and 707 (1991).

Based on those letters, the Security Council issued a presidential statement on 26 February 2010 (S/PRST/2010/5) welcoming the letter from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq and the steps carried out by Iraq and requesting IAEA to indicate its position regarding Iraq's cooperation with the Agency. On 11 March 2010, the Director General of IAEA informed the Secretary-General that Iraq has excellent cooperation with IAEA (see S/2010/150). We expected a positive response from the Security Council in the form of a resolution which would lift the remaining restrictions on Iraq in the field of disarmament so that Iraq would be able to benefit from scientific progress and technology. However, this did not happen, possibly because of the concern of the international community and the Security Council, particularly the five permanent members, at that time regarding preparations for the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the importance of the Conference yielding positive results to end the stalemate of the past 10 years, as well as other international concerns which were given priority.

In addition to what I have just discussed, Iraq has recently taken important steps in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation. In this regard, I would like to refer to the letter of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council dated 25 July 2010 (see S/2010/403). We have decided to voluntarily adhere to the Additional Protocol to the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement between Iraq and IAEA. On 16 July 2010, Iraq provided notification to IAEA, on the basis of article 17 of the Additional Protocol, in response to IAEA's initial declaration. Furthermore, we have set up a national committee of experts, with the participation of the relevant Iraqi authorities, for the liquidation of chemical residues of the former chemical weapons programme and, on 28 June 2010, Iraq submitted a briefing to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) on this matter, and it received full approval from that organization. We will proceed without delay to liquidate those residues with the assistance of our friends and the international community. We are also privileged to have begun our membership of the Executive Council of OPCW for the period 2010 to 2012.

The Iraqi Government also decided, on 13 July 2010, to join The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is following the legal and administrative procedures for joining. Moreover, the Iraqi Government adopted a strict mechanism to control dual-use items as part of its transparency- and confidence-building measures with international bodies on disarmament, all of which have been reported to IAEA, OPCW and other disarmament bodies.

After all of these steps taken by Iraq, we are looking forward to the Security Council's consideration of this issue and its adoption of an appropriate resolution to end all remaining restrictions on Iraq in the field of disarmament.

As for the remaining contracts of the oil-for-food programme, the Iraqi Central Bank received a letter from the United Nations, dated 30 April 2010, which stated that 65 disputed contracts remain. Consistent with the Iraqi Government's desire to finish the remainder of the oil-for-food programme as soon as possible, a ministerial committee headed by the Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Affairs was formed to follow up and audit controversial contracts with the relevant Iraqi ministries. The committee recommended, in principle, to pay the sums due for 26 contracts partially or entirely. As for the remaining 39 contracts, the committee decided to settle and end this programme completely before Iraq presents its third quarterly report, based on paragraph 5 of Security Council resolution 1905 (2009).

With regard to the protection of Iraq's funds and the implementation of the successor arrangement for the Development Fund for Iraq and the International Advisory and Monitoring Board in accordance with

Security Council resolution 1905 (2009), Iraq is doing everything possible to provide the requirements for the protection of Iraqi funds, whether by ending the financial claims of individuals and companies that were inherited from the former Iraqi regime, or through the settlement of its sovereign debts, or through contact with banks and international institutions to seek possibilities for adequate protection. Iraq has covered all of those areas, as described in Iraq's second quarterly report to the Security Council, issued in document S/2010/365* of 8 July 2010.

However, the assessment reached by the Iraqi Government so far confirms that the protection of banks and financial institutions is not up to the level of protection that would be provided by a resolution of the Security Council under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. Thus, the Government of Iraq will continue its efforts to take the appropriate decisions after further contacts with the relevant authorities and will determine its position in this regard at the time of the forthcoming third quarterly report.

Removing the provisions of Chapter VII which imposed on Iraq financial and other burdens that affect its sovereignty has almost become part of our bitter past, and we are serious in our determination to dispose of them with the Security Council's help. What Iraq has done over the years that followed the fall of the former regime in the area of respect for and commitment to the resolutions of international legitimacy should be responded to by the Security Council with appreciation and consideration. We request that the Council take the necessary measures to liberate Iraq from all restrictions imposed on it by Security Council resolutions, in order to enable Iraq to exercise its natural role as an effective member of the international community, to perform its duties and to enjoy its rights, as was the case before the adoption of Security Council resolution 661 (1990).

The Government of Iraq, while it highly appreciates the role of UNAMI in providing advice and support, looks forward to that role becoming more effective and influential through the return of the specialized agencies, funds and programmes of the United Nations to work in Iraq, making an actual direct contribution to the process of building and reconstruction. The constitutionally elected Iraqi Government, while reiterating its desire to extend the UNAMI mandate, hopes that this mandate will be to provide the needed support and assistance through a specific mechanism and with the prior approval of the Iraqi Government.

The President (*spoke in Russian*): There are no further speakers on my list. In accordance with the understanding reached in the Council's prior consultations, I now invite Council members to informal consultations to continue our discussion on the subject.

The meeting rose at 10.40 a.m.

United Nations S/PV.6369

Security Council

Sixty-fifth year

Provisional

6369th meeting

Thursday, 5 August 2010, 10 a.m.

New York

President	Mr. Churkin	(Russian Federation)
Members	Austria	Mr. Ebner
	Bosnia and Herzegovina	Mr. Barbalić
	Brazil	Mr. Moretti
	China	Mr. Yang Tao
	France	Mr. De Rivière
	Gabon	Mr. Moungara Moussotsi
	Japan	Mr. Arima
	Lebanon	Ms. Ziade
	Mexico	Mr. Puente
	Nigeria	Mr. Lolo
	Turkey	Mr. Apakan
	Uganda	Mr. Mugoya
	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	Mr. Quarrey
	United States of America	Ms. DiCarlo

Agenda

The situation concerning Iraq

Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 6 of resolution 1883 (2009) (S/2010/406)

Note verbale dated 28 July 2010 from the Permanent Mission of Iraq to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (S/2010/404)

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10-47571 (E)

Please recycle

The meeting was called to order at 10.05 a.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

The situation concerning Iraq

Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 6 of resolution 1883 (2009) (S/2010/406)

Note verbale dated 28 July 2010 from the Permanent Mission of Iraq to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (S/2010/404)

The President (*spoke in Russian*): I should like to inform the Council that I have received a letter from the representative of Iraq, in which he requests to be invited to participate in the consideration of the item on the Council's agenda. In conformity with the usual practice, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite that representative to participate in the consideration of the item, without the right to vote, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure.

There being no objection, it is so decided.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Al Bayati (Iraq) took a seat at the Council table.

The President (*spoke in Russian*): The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. The Council is meeting in accordance with the understanding reached in its prior consultations.

Members have before them docu S/2010/407, which contains the text of a resolution submitted by Japan, Turkey, the U Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland an United States of America.

I wish to draw the attention of Council mem to document S/2010/406, containing the report o Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 6 resolution 1883 (2009). I also wish to draw attention of members to document S/2010 containing a note verbale dated 28 July 2010 fro Permanent Mission of Iraq to the United Na addressed to the Secretary-General.

It is my understanding that the Council is r to proceed to the vote on the draft resolution befo Unless I hear any objection, I shall put the resolution to the vote now.

There being no objection, it is so decided.

A vote was taken by show of hands.

In favour:

Austria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, C France, Gabon, Japan, Lebanon, Mexico, Nig Russian Federation, Turkey, Uganda, U Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ire United States of America.

The President (*spoke in Russian*): There 15 votes in favour. The draft resolution has adopted unanimously as resolution 1936 (2010).

The Security Council has thus concluded present stage of its consideration of the item o agenda.

The meeting rose at 10.10 a.m.

United Nations S/PV.6370

Security Council

Sixty-fifth year

Provisional

6370th meeting

Friday, 6 August 2010, 10 a.m.

New York

President:	Mr. Churkin	(Russian Federation)
Members:	Austria	Mr. Ebner
	Bosnia and Herzegovina	Mr. Barbalić
	Brazil	Mrs. Dunlop
	China	Mr. Wang Min
	France	Mr. De Rivière
	Gabon	Mr. Issoze-Ngondet
	Japan	Mr. Sumi
	Lebanon	Ms. Ziade
	Mexico	Mr. Heller
	Nigeria	Mrs. Ogwu
	Turkey	Mr. Apakan
	Uganda	Mr. Mugoya
	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	Mr. Parham
	United States of America	Ms. DiCarlo

Agenda

United Nations peacekeeping operations

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10-47717 (E)

Please recycle

The meeting was called to order at 10.05 a.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

United Nations peacekeeping operations

The President (*spoke in Russian*): I should like to inform the Council that I have received letters from the representatives of Bangladesh, Canada, India, Pakistan, the Philippines and the Republic of Korea, in which they request to be invited to participate in the consideration of the item on the Council's agenda. In conformity with the usual practice, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite those representatives to participate in the consideration of the item, without the right to vote, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure.

There being no objection, it is so decided.

At the invitation of the President, the representatives of the aforementioned countries took the seats reserved for them at the side of the Council Chamber.

The President (*spoke in Russian*): In accordance with the understanding reached in the Council's prior consultations, I shall take it that the Security Council agrees to extend invitations under rule 39 of its provisional rules of procedure to Mr. Alain Le Roy, Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations; Lieutenant-General Sikander Afzal, Force Commander of the United Nations Mission in Liberia; Lieutenant-General Babacar Gaye, Force Commander of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo; Major General Moses Bisong Obi, Force Commander of the United Nations Mission in the Sudan; Major General Robert Mood, Head of Mission and Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization; and Major-General Luiz Guilherme Paul Cruz, Force Commander of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti.

There being no objection, it is so decided.

I would also like to welcome the other Force Commanders present with us today.

The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. The Council is meeting in accordance with the understanding reached in its prior consultations.

Peacekeeping is one of the key activities of the United Nations, an effective instrument for maintaining international peace and security. This year the number of peacekeepers has reached a historic high. Two-thirds of these are uniformed personnel who play a lead role in addressing such challenging tasks as supporting the efforts of national Governments to restore stability and strengthen peace, ensuring the protection of civilians, and monitoring ceasefires.

We hope that today's meeting will give us an opportunity once again to better understand the current problems faced by peacekeepers, and their military contingents above all, as they carry out the duties entrusted to them by the Security Council. We hope that it will help to enhance the Security Council's level of military expertise.

At this meeting, the Security Council will hear briefings by Mr. Le Roy, Lieutenant General Sikander Afzal, Lieutenant General Babacar Gaye, Major General Moses Bisong Obi, Major General Robert Mood and Major General Luiz Guilherme Paul Cruz.

I give the floor to Mr. Le Roy.

Mr. Le Roy (*spoke in French*): I thank you very much, Sir, for this opportunity once again to debate the issue of peacekeeping operations. This discussion demonstrates the ongoing and tireless support of the Security Council for these operations, in particular today in the presence of our Force Commanders and heads of the military components of our operations. I believe that those who work on the front lines of those operations are very pleased and proud to be able to address the Council themselves.

My statement will be brief because the Council has had regular opportunities to hear me speak in the past months. Today's meeting will, instead, offer the opportunity for interaction with the Force Commanders.

I simply wish to note that there are currently deployed 15 peacekeeping operations, in the strict sense of the word. The Council has opted to hear representatives from five of these, whom you named a moment ago, Sir. All the others are seated behind us and are prepared to answer any question that the members of the Council should care to address to them. Unfortunately, as Council members are aware, two of

them had to leave New York recently, at my request, due to heightened tensions concerning their operations. They are Major General Asarta Cuevas, Force Commander of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNMIL), whom I asked to return to preside over the important tripartite meeting held on Wednesday evening, and Lieutenant General Nyamvumba, Force Commander of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur, who was compelled to return to his core tasks in the field to address the current tensions in certain camps in Darfur.

Among those who will speak, we have chosen a panel that is very representative of the broad diversity of our peacekeeping operations, from the oldest — the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, created in 1948 — to such multidimensional operations as the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), the United Nations Mission in Liberia, the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti and the United Nations Mission in the Sudan.

(*spoke in English*)

I should just like to remind the Council of the current figures. As of 31 July, we had almost 120,000 peacekeepers deployed, among them 84,000 military, 13,000 police officers, and 22,000 civilians. Thus, we have almost 100,000 people in uniform, plus 22,000 civilians. There has been, of course, a drawdown of the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad and MONUSCO, but we are still at a very significant level. We cannot speak of a really important drawdown; we consider that we have come from a period of surge to a period of consolidation. We are now at a plateau in consolidation, because we do not see any new peacekeeping operation on the way. We do not complain about that.

I just want to mention that this consolidation phase will be used by us to consolidate and improve our efficiency in so many fields: planning, oversight, drafting protection of civilians strategies and robust peacekeeping — in brief, our reform agenda. I also want to mention that, of course, we are maintaining our commitment to our reform agenda. Our New Horizon process is going well. In September, the Council will receive our first progress report. I must also note that Susana Malcorra is working quite well and progressing on the global field support strategy, on which the Council will also receive a report very soon.

To conclude, since I said that I would be very brief, I should like to point out to the Council that Lieutenant General Obiakor will complete his tour of duty in early September. On behalf of the Secretariat, I should like to thank him for his outstanding commitment to the United Nations, first as the Force Commander of UNMIL in Liberia, under very difficult conditions, and for the past two years as Military Adviser. We have greatly benefited from his experience and wise advice. We are extremely thankful and grateful to him, and wish him the best for the future.

The President (*spoke in Russian*): I thank Mr. Le Roy for his briefing.

I now give the floor to Lieutenant General Sikander Afzal.

Lieutenant General Afzal: My name is Sikander Afzal and I am the Force Commander of the United Nation Mission in Liberia (UNMIL). It is an honour for me to be allowed to say a few words about the Mission in Liberia.

Liberia is emerging from the devastation caused by 14 years of civil war. Its Government is taking the right steps to improve infrastructure, governance and the well-being of its people with the help of the world community, donor nations and the United Nations. However, it still has a long way to go.

From a regional perspective, there is no direct threat to Liberia from any of its neighbours, but the volatility of the region, coupled with the tribal, ethnic and demographic links among regional countries means that a serious event in any one country is likely to spill over into another. Although Liberia is generally calm and peaceful, unemployment, poverty and weak infrastructure are hampering development. Let me highlight some of the most serious security challenges to Liberia.

The greatest challenge facing the Government of Liberia is that of law and order and dealing with criminality. Linked to this is the problem of maintaining internal security. The root of the problem is the population's lack of confidence in the police and judicial systems. The police lack the ability to respond to crime effectively, although the situation is improving. At the same time, the judicial system does not have the capacity to deal with the increasing caseload. The lack of confidence often results in vigilante mob justice requiring the intervention of UNMIL.

Land disputes are a common occurrence in Liberia as a legacy of the war. Many displaced people have settled in areas belonging to other people, and the laws relating to property rights, boundaries and natural resources are not clear. When tribal and ethnic factors are added in, disagreements can quickly turn violent.

UNMIL military has successfully completed stage three of its drawdown. Its military strength is now 8,102, down from 14,000 personnel, representing 43 different troop-contributing countries, as mandated by the Security Council in its resolution 1885 (2009) of September 2009. UNMIL remains headquartered in Monrovia. The operating forces are deployed in two sectors, with three infantry battalions each, a force reserve of a battalion, six engineer companies and three field hospitals.

The drawdown has meant that remaining units have had to extend their areas of responsibility with no additional resources. As a consequence, it has become difficult to maintain a presence in all districts, and UNMIL has increased the number of extended long-distance patrols by air and by road. In addition, our reaction time in dealing with unforeseen situations has increased. Therefore, the battalion-sized quick reaction force is now based in Monrovia and at two forward operating bases adjacent to main communication routes to the Guinea and Côte d'Ivoire borders. In the absence of engineering capacity within the country, it is the force engineers who keep the roads open all year round and thus ensure that logistics reach not only the United Nations camps, but also the local populace.

Some of the lessons learned in the past year have led to making the crisis management mechanisms within UNMIL more effective. Joint exercises of UNMIL military and UNMIL police personnel have increased. There is a need to train and equip the United Nations military force to respond to civil disorder by establishing within the military contingents company-sized units capable of conducting riot control. Steps have been taken to improve joint military-police cooperation, in the shape of table-top exercises and rehearsals on the ground. On the crisis-management side, a formal crisis-management team and a crisis-management working group have been established — chaired by the special Representative of the Secretary-General — and the effectiveness of the Joint Operations Centre has been improved.

Let me conclude by highlighting three major challenges for UNMIL and its force in the near future.

First, the upcoming national elections at the end of 2011 will be a prominent marker in measuring the success of the UNMIL mission and in shaping the Mission's withdrawal from Liberia. Support for the elections is expected to place a huge burden on the UNMIL force to deal with any volatile situations, as well as on logistics capabilities, particularly in the light of UNMIL's reduced numbers.

The second challenge is the budgetary constraints as a consequence of drawdown and the funding available for peacekeeping. While the force has been reduced in numbers, its tasks remain the same. In order to fulfil its mandate, it has to undertake more aerial and ground patrolling, which implies more flying hours and more consumption of fuel and wear and tear on equipment. Thus, the tasks cannot be completed when a reduced budget is allocated to the Mission.

The third challenge is the transition in security tasks from UNMIL to the Government of Liberia. The Mission's exit strategy envisages a final withdrawal when Liberia has a self-sustainable security sector able to perform independent of the UNMIL mission. Transition planning has commenced for UNMIL's handover of its currently mandated security sector responsibilities to the appropriate national agencies, following a very fruitful and productive workshop in June.

Significant progress has been achieved. However, slow progress in security sector reform, the absence of police infrastructure, a limited national security presence in outlying counties and weak capacity of the criminal justice sector pose huge challenges to the transition process. Considerable assistance from the United Nations and bilateral partners is required to ensure a smooth and seamless transition process.

In conclusion, I would like to submit that while at present the situation is calm and stable, this is primarily as a result of the deterrence of the UNMIL force and the United Nations police. However, in case a rapid withdrawal of the force is undertaken after the elections without building the capacity of the country's security sector, the potential for the country slipping into internal strife cannot be ruled out. From a situation of success we may have another Timor-Leste, Democratic Republic of the Congo or Haiti on our hands.

I humbly request the members of the Security Council, donor countries and other players to invest and focus all their resources on strengthening the Liberian police and military and improving the communication infrastructure in the country over the next few years, so that UNMIL can leave as a success.

The President (*spoke in Russian*): I thank Lieutenant General Azfal for his briefing.

I now give the floor to Lieutenant General Babacar Gaye.

Lieutenant General Gaye (*spoke in French*): As the outgoing Force Commander of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), I would like to say a few words on the challenges faced by the Mission and the progress it has made in the area of protecting civilians.

As the Council is aware, it was in 2000 that the task of protecting civilians first figured in the mandate of what was then the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC). Of course, that undertaking was entirely in line with the Secretary-General's statement during the sixty-third session of the General Assembly in which he recalled that the United Nations was the champion of the most vulnerable (see A/63/PV.5). Quite clearly, that statement in no way detracted from the primary role of States in protecting their people, as was reiterated at the 2005 World Summit. For the United Nations, this is about helping countries to help themselves by providing tailored support to meet individual circumstances.

(*spoke in English*)

In MONUC, now MONUSCO, the protection of civilians is the Mission's priority task. Although the military was nearly at 20,000 in strength and possessed some useful capabilities, including eight attack helicopters, we had an operational area equivalent to the size of Western Europe before expansion to the east, as well as a population nearing 65 million people and limited intelligence assets. In the eastern provinces of the Kivus alone, the entire force could be spread out to just one peacekeeper per 20 square kilometres. Adding to those problems was the lack of roads and infrastructure, which made it extremely slow and difficult to get from one place to another. It is undoubtedly a beautiful part of the world, but the climate and terrain can be arduous, rendering many places remote and inaccessible.

The threats to the population have also been numerous and varied. They have faced the physical threat posed by countless armed groups, as well as the broader human security threats stemming from years of poverty and underdevelopment. At the same time, our partner on the ground — the Forces armées de la République démocratique du Congo (FARDC) — is struggling to integrate and exercise command and control over tens of thousands of former militia combatants. We must recognize that, without proper military training, equipment and communications, and operating in a highly volatile political environment, many of the members of the FARDC themselves constitute a threat to the population. Our work with the country's senior military command to help with planning, military justice and logistical support must be seen in the context of our protection mandate.

Our approach to this problem has been very much an integrated one with our civilian colleagues in the Mission. Together, we have identified the areas of greatest risk, and have then set about deploying peacekeepers to the most vulnerable sites. Our approach is based on the premise that presence equals protection. And in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, presence equals mobility. Each battalion has been required to deploy to around six to eight separate sites and to maintain a high profile and a robust presence both day and night.

We cannot pretend to provide blanket protection. We have attempted to overcome gaps by conducting regular long-range patrols and temporary two-to-three-day standing deployments. In parallel, there have been deployments by the Congolese army. Admittedly, however, not all units have a positive benefit, for the reasons I have mentioned. In essence, that has been the framework around which our approach has been built, and, over time, improvements and enhancements have been made.

I have mentioned presence and mobility; but there is a third essential ingredient of our protection effort: communication. The Mission's military and civilian components have increasingly concentrated on improving our communication with the population and with key actors, both to understand the situation better and to make ourselves better understood.

For instance, community liaison interpreters are now deployed to many of the troop sites to improve liaison and interaction with locals. A network of high-frequency radios and mobile phones is being rolled out to bolster the already established unit surveillance centres. And multidisciplinary Joint Protection Teams are now quickly dispatched to areas where there are reports of problems, to advise on the best course of action.

The Mission's Joint Military Analysis Centre has also been a great help in pointing the Force towards emerging areas of concern. In the very remote areas of Bas-Uele, in northern Orientale province, where the Lord's Resistance Army continues to prey on small village communities, MONUSCO is also conducting farming patrols, allowing villagers to work in safety in their fields. And in parts of the volatile Kivus, we are providing security escorts so that groups of up to 1,000 civilians can go to their weekly markets. Thus, we have certainly made some advances and have become more adept at tackling this task.

Managing expectations has been a major challenge. Congolese see a relatively well-equipped and well-organized team of Blue Helmets and cannot understand why we cannot protect everyone, everywhere. Well-motivated and concerned actors in the international community often have high and, I dare say, unrealistic expectations of the force. We have not shied away from the challenge and have sought out humanitarian and civil society actors, both Congolese and international, to help us do a better job.

Ultimately, the protection of the population in the Democratic Republic of the Congo will depend upon expansion of State authority and the rule of law across the country. This is still a work in progress, and the force has lent its support to this effort through the work of engineering units and other specialists.

The protection of civilians is new ground for many of the troops, and there is a need for in-depth United Nations military doctrine and more comprehensive individual and collective training on the protection of civilians. The greater use of interpreters is also vital to overcoming some of the language and cultural issues, and operational reach and responsiveness hinge on the United Nations ability to muster sufficient and capable transport — particularly aviation — assets.

Even then, try as we might, we will never be able to offer a complete guarantee of security. There will always be risks, and the Mission will always be vulnerable to some form of criticism. But by adopting this proactive, high-profile and — where necessary — robust stance, the United Nations is able to show a strong and effective commitment to the very important task of championing the most vulnerable. I am enormously proud of what our young soldiers, their officers and civilian colleagues in the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and MONUSCO have managed to achieve in this regard, and I have every confidence they will continue to do so in the future.

The President (*spoke in Russian*): I thank Lieutenant General Gaye for his briefing and now give the floor to Major General Moses Bisong Obi.

Major General Obi: I thank you, Mr. President, for this opportunity. I bring you warm greetings from my Special Representative of the Secretary-General.

In my briefing this morning, I will attempt to acquaint the Security Council with an overview of the military activities of the United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS). I am the Force Commander of UNMIS. I will briefly discuss the current situation, our achievements, the challenges facing us and the outlook for the future.

UNMIS is in a critical period of its mandate implementation in the Sudan as the country approaches the 9 January referendum. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) requires that two referendums be held by 9 January 2011 — one in which the people of Southern Sudan will vote for unity or secession, and the other through which the people or the region of Abyei will remain in Northern Sudan or become part of Southern Sudan. Although the referendums are to be a nationally managed process, both parties have called on UNMIS to play a strong role in support of the referendums.

The referendums are arguably the most momentous events to happen in the country since its independence and, with five months to go until 9 January, time is swiftly running out for the parties to come to political agreement on a number of issues. While the Southern Sudan Referendum Commission has been established, it has yet to become fully operational and only has until September to supervise

the registration of voters. Worryingly, the Abyei referendum commission has yet to be formed.

UNMIS planning and preparation are in full flow to provide support to the referendums. Technical reconnaissance of the 79 country referendum bases is complete, and logistical and engineering planning is at full tilt in an effort to set up the bases ready for occupation. It is from these bases that United Nations election teams will operate to support the referendums. Lessons learned from elections earlier this year are being applied, but the task is complex because of the increase of the number of polling sites at the county level, as opposed to the state level in the previous election.

In terms of the current situation, most of the day-to-day violence in the Mission area is primarily in Southern Sudan and is tribal in nature. Cattle rustling and abductions are routinely taking place in many parts of Southern Sudan. Although these are practices that have gone on for generations among and, at times, within tribes and in a wider area than Southern Sudan alone, currently they are often inextricably linked to minor political players and local renegade actors posturing for their own benefit.

The emergence of rebel groups in a number of areas, linked very closely to tribal affiliations and dissatisfied losers of the last elections, has been the trend recently. This has manifested itself in clashes with the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) in three areas of our sector 3, resulting in the displacement of the civilian population and human rights abuses by SPLA elements.

On our flanks, we watch the events in Darfur unfold and keep a close eye on the analysis that is available. Of specific interest is where the southern border of Darfur meets with western Bahr el Ghazal in Southern Sudan. This is a large expanse of ground that is not easily covered by UNMIS patrols. We are thus largely unsighted on activities in this area, and we have evolved plans to deliberately insert long-range patrols into this area in order to enhance information-gathering. This effort has, however, often faced obstructions from the SPLA.

Regarding the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), we receive unconfirmed reports of violent crimes in the border areas between Western Equatoria and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Our concern is that the LRA activities have an impact on the security of the population. We are therefore taking this threat very seriously.

One of the key CPA milestones is the redeployment of forces across the border line between the North and the South. The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) have redeployed north of the current boundary line, which is known colloquially as the 1-1-5-6 line, as mandated by the CPA, and this has been verified. Generally speaking, the SAF is compliant with the terms of the CPA. However, to date, we have a verified figure of 34.85 per cent of the stated strength of SPLA that has redeployed south of the current boundary line, as opposed to 100 per cent of the SAF. It is, however, possible that the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) may have overstated the numbers of its actual armed forces to begin with, and thus the percentage of redeployment may be much higher, as not much SPLA presence or activity has been visible within the current boundary line.

I would like to focus now on the achievements of UNMIS and in particular the UNMIS military force. Despite the wide gap between the political stance of both parties, the ceasefire has continued to hold to a great extent. All the violence in the UNMIS area of responsibility is triggered at lower levels, either over resources or because of local political and tribal grievances.

The Sudanese elections took place between 11 and 15 April without major security-related incidents. The canvassing and polling periods were characterized by noticeable restraint in the incidence of violence across the country, although independent SPLM candidates were openly intimidated. Northern Sudan is outside of our area of responsibility, and we cannot say what may have happened there. The post-elections period was tense and not helped by the delayed announcement of results at the end of April. Posturing by losing candidates demanding political accommodation and a significant increase in SPLA obstruction of UNMIS operations were noticed.

Our primary focus is the protection of civilians, and we do this in partnership with our civilian pillars, as well as with the host nation. The provision of safe and secure areas around the team sites has already been planned. Currently, the situation across the Sudan, with the exception of Darfur, has improved on the whole. However, in particular areas in the South — specifically Jonglei and Upper Nile states, some areas

along the North-South border and specific districts along the border between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Sudan — cases of intimidation and violence towards civilians continue.

We cannot be complacent and are in the process of planning operations specifically designed to combat the targeting of civilians. Operation Safe Refuge is one such operation, and requires that every team site to pre-select and plan a refuge for internally displaced persons (IDPs). The challenge is significant as it involves coordinating not only military, but also civilian pillars, and encouraging United Nations country teams to come on board to provide through non-governmental organizations the key requirements of water, shelter and sanitation for a predetermined number of IDPs.

Permit me to now discuss the key challenges we face in UNMIS, in addition to the referendums I have already touched on. Throughout most of this year, we have seen our ability to operate both North and South of the 1-1-5-6 line deteriorate because of the belligerence of both parties. Freedom of movement is a constant challenge to the force and all elements of the Mission; incidents range from the deliberate obstruction of logistical convoys to the feeding of false information on current situations in the area.

Forceful abuses have happened as well. Two recent examples are the hijacking of an UNMIS helicopter and the manhandling of an UNMIS patrol, including a helicopter crew, in Kodok, Southern Sudan, in July. This latter case has triggered high-level political démarches and engagements with the Government of Southern Sudan, and mechanisms to prevent such future abuses have been agreed upon. The issue of freedom of movement and harassment of United Nations personnel is thus being treated very seriously, as it could impact on UNMIS mandate implementation and the credibility of the referendum.

We are constrained by inadequate assets available to the force to undertake operations. This creates inevitable drag in our planning and tasking flexibility. Resources are limited and, given that across Southern Sudan the rains make movement almost impossible, the only manner of projecting the force is by air. We continue to work with the Mission Support Unit to try to acquire the support necessary for agility and flexibility in our intended manoeuvres and force projection.

Looking to the future, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General has developed an UNMIS/United Nations country team integrated action plan for the Sudan. The plan has five strategic objectives, which include the holding of credible referendums in Southern Sudan and Abyei; fruitful consultations in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile states; the successful negotiation of post-referendum engagement arrangements; overall Mission area stability and protection of civilians; and finally, improved governance capacity and rule of law in Southern Sudan.

The military will lead in Mission area stability and protection of civilians. My plan is to deliver a more agile and mobile force to achieve Mission area stability. To this end, emphasis is being placed on patrolling and use of mobile reserves. In view of the extensive area of responsibility and the absence of roads, the demand for air assets is huge. We have also identified one sanctuary per team site for the protection of civilians. All pillars of UNMIS and the United Nations country team are working together in this regard. In addition to the physical protecting of civilians, mitigation and deterrent troop patrolling are also being employed to discourage violence against civilians.

Finally, I would like to state that the referendums to be organized in Southern Sudan in January 2011 are of historic significance. The outcome could have vast consequences, not only for the Sudan but for the region and for Africa as a whole. The experience of the last elections revealed challenges related to the lack of capacity of local institutions. The challenge for UNMIS and the international community to ensure credible referendums is huge. UNMIS is conscious of this responsibility and all hands are on deck to ensure successful mandate implementation.

The President (*spoke in Russian*): I thank Major General Obi for his briefing. I now give the floor to Major General Robert Mood.

Major General Mood: It is a privilege to serve as a United Nations peacekeeper and it is an honour to address the Security Council today. It is also an honour to lead the first United Nations peacekeeping operation, created by the Council in August 1949 — the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO). Our mission area straddles complex cultural, religious, historic and perceptional fault lines

in Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria. The work of UNTSO is twofold. On the one hand we continue to observe, on the Council's behalf, withdrawals and military disengagements between Israel, Lebanon and Syria. On the other hand, through regional dialogue we continue to assist the efforts of all five countries towards a regional peace.

One might ask: Does UNTSO still deliver on the commitment made by the Council in 1949? Let me answer with four thoughts. First, UNTSO continues to provide the international community with a regional presence and perspectives on the Middle East that are not limited to local withdrawal and disengagement areas. Secondly, we continue to enjoy consent and appreciation wherever we operate, from our headquarters in Jerusalem, to Amman to Beirut, Damascus and Cairo. Thirdly, once the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) and the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) have accomplished their mandates, UNTSO provides an available mechanism for transition, while also supporting the parties in their subsequent implementation of a comprehensive regional peace in the Middle East.

Finally, impartial observation, de-escalation of incidents and an objective regional perspective are delivered at a fraction of the cost of larger operations. As borders are discussed among Israel, its neighbours and a future Palestinian State, UNTSO continues to be as current today as when the Green Line was drawn.

Allow me to highlight some achievements. First, the Force Commanders of UNIFIL and UNDOF recognize the complementary value of unarmed UNTSO observers under their operational control. The 153 unarmed female and male observers from 23 nations are well-trained and experienced officers, contributing significantly to UNIFIL and UNDOF operations.

Secondly, UNTSO, UNIFIL and UNDOF Force Commanders have achieved unity of effort on mandate implementation, enabled by their combined role as heads of mission, thus aligning military and civilian components in the same direction.

Thirdly, our unarmed male and female observers enjoy unique access and trust among the local authorities and population in South Lebanon and on the Golan.

Fourthly, we are welcomed and actively engaged in bilateral and multilateral dialogues that serve to de-escalate incidents and eliminate violence.

Fifthly, we enjoy an open and constructive host nation dialogue with all five countries on a range of issues related to support and cooperation.

Lastly, UNIFIL, UNTSO and UNDOF are harmonizing and cooperating effectively on logistical aspects of the missions, achieving cost-effectiveness and enhancing operational output.

Allow me also to point out a few concerns and challenges. First, improved coordination among the civilian and military components of the United Nations family in order to achieve integrated effects that imply sustainable results carry considerable potential.

Secondly, much of the complexity we face is born in and fuelled from countries beyond the five in the Mission area. There is a need to relate to those who can influence the military landscape, including States that are not within the Mission area and non-States that are.

Thirdly, the credibility of the United Nations rests on impartiality — actual and as perceived by the host nations.

Lastly, seeds of conflict born of the fundamental long-term risks to our planet, such as the lack of fresh water, are becoming more apparent, including in the Middle East.

The United Nations Truce Supervision Organization is the most enduring evidence of the Security Council's commitment to supporting the achievement of a comprehensive regional peace in the Middle East. As the United Nations calls upon the parties to show maximum restraint, refrain from violations of Security Council resolutions and engage in active dialogue, the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization remains ready and available to support their positive engagement.

The President (*spoke in Russian*): I thank Major General Mood for his briefing. I now give the floor to Major General Luiz Guilherme Paul Cruz.

Major General Paul Cruz: I am General Paul Cruz, Force Commander of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH).

I would like to thank you, Mr. President, for this precious opportunity to present the Security Council

with a view of MINUSTAH and its military component, with a focus on humanitarian assistance, which is an important part of the Mission's daily operations.

Since its inception on 1 June 2004, the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti has reached a number of milestones. In the midst of ongoing violence in the country, legislative and executive elections were planned that, after having been postponed several times, were held in February 2006. MINUSTAH played a significant role in ensuring that the presidential elections were organized, monitored and carried out in a free and fair manner.

In 2006 and 2007, the military component of MINUSTAH assisted in the restoration and maintenance of the rule of law and public safety and order in Haiti, including in the central areas of Port-au-Prince. The years of 2008 and 2009 were rife with riots and the destruction that the hurricanes wrought upon the nation.

On 12 January 2010, an earthquake levelled entire neighbourhoods in the capital city, delivered a severe blow to a still-weak Haitian economy and infrastructure, and impeded nation-building efforts in the country. The catastrophe also led to a climate of political uncertainty, interrupting a period of relatively smooth progress towards elections that previously been scheduled for February 2010.

In his semi-annual report on the situation in Haiti dated 22 February 2010 (S/2010/200), the Secretary-General provided recommendations on the future role of the United Nations Mission in Haiti. After entering a period of consolidation, MINUSTAH needed a surge effort in order to help the Government preserve the gains of stabilization to date and enable a transition to long-term reconstruction.

Since the earthquake, humanitarian assistance, in conjunction with relief and recovery operations, has represented the primary focus of MINUSTAH and the United Nations agencies, funds and programmes, alongside international organizations and non-governmental organizations, with, of course, the full cooperation of all countries represented in this Council and many others.

The Mission as a whole is actively engaged in carrying out stage 2 of this concept of humanitarian relief operations. It must be said that food, water, some form of shelter and emergency medical assistance have been delivered in a stable environment. There have been no major epidemic outbreaks. A strategic plan detailing stage 3, the normalization phase, is currently being developed by MINUSTAH.

Notwithstanding the new mandate bestowed upon the military component of MINUSTAH following the earthquake, humanitarian assistance has always been a key area of focus, along with programmes of violence reduction. Better communication and approaches to dealing with the Haitian people became necessary after incidents that occurred at the beginning of the Mission. Accordingly, coordination of action between civilians and military personnel, and thus of humanitarian assistance, became a priority for the success of the military component's mission in MINUSTAH.

Our activities are not intended to be a vehicle for the Government's development efforts or to replace civilian organizations that have a greater capacity for undertaking development projects. Rather, the humanitarian activities carried out are to support the Mission's goals.

The military component has been providing quick response assistance in the aftermath of such events as hurricanes, floods, building collapses, accidents and security breaches. Besides providing security, the military component's distribution of the necessities of life, such as water, food, shelter and medical assistance, comprises its ongoing activities in support of United Nations agencies and programmes and non-United Nations organizations.

Naturally, since the earthquake, our focus on these activities has increased exponentially. Through its joint operations and tasking centre, it has been possible for MINUSTAH to coordinate assistance provided by diverse actors. A long list of countries provided immediate assistance that was delivered as fast as possible.

United Nations military had control of security, which allowed the United States Joint Task Force Haiti and troops from Canada, Spain, France and Italy, among others, to carry out their main humanitarian assistance tasks. The military component now has the added responsibility of participating in the security of the camps for internally displaced persons (IDPs). We focus on the safety and security of those women and children who are most at risk.

Our engineers are working diligently every day to improve the quality of life for communities across Haiti on projects such as removing rubble, clearing roads, rebuilding bridges, cleaning canals, preparing sites for IDP camps, clearing areas to rebuild schools and orphanages, digging wells, and so on.

Since the inception of the Mission, the military component of MINUSTAH has been involved in humanitarian assistance. It has acquired great deal of expertise in these areas, especially following the hurricanes of 2004 and 2008. After the earthquake, it used this expertise to work with the civilian branches of MINUSTAH, the United Nations country team and non-United Nations organizations in completing their tasks. The military force will continue to pursue these activities in order to contribute to the fulfilment of MINUSTAH's mandate to create a secure and stable environment in Haiti.

The President (*spoke in Russian*): I thank Major General Paul Cruz for his briefing.

Before I give the floor to Security Council members, I would like to welcome the Military Adviser for peacekeeping operations, Lieutenant General Chikadibia Obiakor, who, in accordance with the understanding reached by the Security Council in its prior consultations, is attending today's meeting in accordance with rule 39 of its provisional rules of procedure. As the General's term of office expires in September 2010, I would like to thank him on behalf of the Council for the job he has done and to wish him every success in his future endeavours.

At this time, I now give the floor to members of the Security Council.

Mr. Barbalić (Bosnia and Herzegovina): Bosnia and Herzegovina would like to thank the Russian Federation for convening this debate on United Nations peacekeeping operations. We thank the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Mr. Alain Le Roy, and Force Commanders Lieutenant General Sikander Afzal, Lieutenant General Babacar Gaye, Major General Moses Bisong Obi, Major General Robert Mood and Major General Luiz Guilherme Paul Cruz for their valuable and comprehensive briefings. We commend their tireless efforts and outstanding work in maintaining international peace and security.

As a police- and troop-contributing country — a country moreover with significant experience of United Nations peacekeeping and peacebuilding efforts — Bosnia and Herzegovina is particularly aware of the importance of the topic we are considering at this meeting.

Achieving sustainable peace from an initial peace agreement requires clear and adequate mandates adapted to country-specific situations, strategic planning and coherent implementation, as well as the consent and commitment of the host country. Bosnia and Herzegovina is convinced that, in order to successfully implement Security Council mandates, the issue of major gaps in capabilities, resources and training has to be addressed through enhanced coordination among the Security Council, the Secretariat and police- and troop-contributing countries. We particularly underscore the role of the Peacebuilding Commission in bringing together all the relevant actors and call for further strengthening and consolidation of its contribution to peacekeeping efforts. We also believe that the Security Council could rely more on its advice.

The United Nations has notably improved the effectiveness of its peacekeeping. However, the challenges posed by the global deployment of United Nations missions will require additional and further improvements in mandate design, strategic planning, cognitive capacity and coherence. We urge the Secretariat to continue to increase its planning capacity expertise, as more data would be helpful in drafting mandates.

Bosnia and Herzegovina stresses the importance of including strategic integrated planning and benchmarks, developed in close consultation with host countries and the relevant regional organizations and stakeholders, wherever possible and appropriate. Clear and carefully calibrated benchmarks can help improve the Security Council's strategic oversight of a mission's progress and facilitate appropriate and timely preparations for further action.

With regard to the increasing need for expertise in areas such as the rule of law, security sector reform and the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process, we believe it is important to improve recruitment and training and to upgrade human-resource rules, especially when a mission's mandate includes a number of peacebuilding aspects. The

United Nations roster system covering experts in the various areas of mission activities should be improved, including with respect to interoperability with similar databases of experts from regional and subregional organizations. The experience and knowledge of civilian, police and military experts from past and current peacekeeping and peacebuilding host countries should also be utilized.

The development of a strategic framework on the protection of civilians, containing elements and parameters for mission-specific strategies, will assist the mission leadership in elaborating a comprehensive protection strategy aligned with a mission's concept of operations. The process of putting such concepts into practice has to be clearly defined and discussed with the troop- and police-contributing countries. In that regard, training modules for pre-deployment and in-mission training for peacekeeping personnel are important.

Peacekeeping operations must complement activities that address the immediate needs of the local population. Implementing quick-impact projects contributes to building confidence in the peacekeepers and gaining support for a peacekeeping mission and its mandate, as well as creating an environment conducive to the peace process.

Bosnia and Herzegovina believes that transfer of ownership and strengthening of national capacities are of key importance, as a peacekeeping operation cannot be a substitute for the political process. We therefore emphasize the importance of activities aimed at that goal, such as the training of national police and military personnel in international humanitarian law, international refugee law and the protection of civilians, as well as the establishment of joint operational teams.

Finally, we would like to stress once more the importance of sincere and devoted effort on the part of the international community in assisting local and regional stakeholders to reach a genuine and constructive political dialogue aimed at solving key political issues. Such an approach would significantly contribute to the creation of an environment conducive to sustainable peace, stability and development.

Mr. Issoze-Ngondet (Gabon) (*spoke in French*): I would like to join with Ambassador Barbalić in congratulating you, Mr. President, on convening this constructive discussion of peacekeeping operations. I also welcome the presence among us of Mr. Alain Le Roy, Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Lieutenant General Sikander Afzal, Lieutenant General Babacar Gaye, Major General Moses Bisong Obi, Major General Robert Mood and Major General Luiz Guilherme Paul Cruz, whom I thank for their very informative briefings.

My delegation would also like to praise the efforts of the United Nations aimed at promoting peace, knowing that, as Mr. Le Roy reminded us, more than 120,000 people are involved in 16 peacekeeping operations on four continents. We pay a well-deserved tribute to the Blue Helmets serving throughout the world. Gabon also wishes to express its great sadness at the loss of many peacekeepers in recent years. The road accident that cost the lives of four Sierra Leone peacekeepers in the province of Southern Darfur on 1 August have added to the list of the deceased.

Having listened to the various speakers, and focusing primarily on the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) and the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), I would like to discuss the following two points: the consolidation of progress achieved in defining and implementing mandates; and the challenges encountered in implementing those mandates.

Turning to our first point — progress achieved in defining and implementing mandates — with regard to Darfur, my delegation welcomes the fact that UNAMID is reaching full deployment for its military, police and civilian components, with 88 per cent, 70 per cent and 75 per cent of the authorized numbers, respectively. We are also pleased with the increasing number of UNAMID patrols and their further expansion into the territory, which has considerably reduced attacks on civilians and helped improve their living conditions.

With regard to MONUSCO, Gabon welcomes the new mandate for the United Nations Mission, which provides, among other things, for the completion of the ongoing military operations in North and South Kivu and in Orientale province, as well as for an improvement in the means available to the Government to protect its people effectively and to strengthen State authority throughout the territory. MONUSCO is also giving support to the victims of the explosion that took

place in the village of Sange in South Kivu on 2 July, proof that the new civilian protection mandate is being implemented. The success of this operation is partly due to the coordinated action that on this occasion prevailed between the Congolese authorities and the United Nations teams on the ground.

In Gabon's view, the mandate has the merit of providing for a future reconfiguration of the Mission based on developments on the ground, thus making the mandate more realistic. We also welcome the fact that Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon visited Kinshasa to preside over the ceremony marking the succession from MONUC to MONUSCO on 1 July. We take this opportunity to salute Mr. Alan Doss, head of MONUC, and to Lieutenant General Babacar Gaye, outgoing commander of MONUC and MONUSCO, for their excellent work in recent years in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. We would also like to welcome the appointment of Mr. Roger Meese as Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and head of MONUSCO and of General Chander Prakash as the new Force Commander of MONUSCO. We have noted the start of the first phase of the drawdown of MONUSCO, as provided for in Security Council resolution 1925 (2010).

Finally, my delegation is pleased to note that, increasingly, new, multidisciplinary approaches are being integrated into peacekeeping mandates, in line with the Secretary-General's 2008 report, such as strengthening the rule of law, protection of civilians, applying mechanisms for preventing the resurgence of conflicts and implementing reconstruction programmes.

I shall now turn to the second point of my statement — the challenges encountered in carrying out the mandates of United Nations missions. The complexity of current crises is leading to difficulty in the implementation peacekeeping mandates, and these crises are often the result, of course, of shortfalls in financial and material resources.

With regard to the Sudan, UNAMID reports a significant deficit in terms of airborne military capacity, including utility helicopters needed for air reconnaissance missions. We deplore the fact that UNAMID also faces restrictions on its freedom of movement, which have increased from 21 per cent in May to 77 per cent in June.

With regard to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, my delegation remains concerned by the scale of the humanitarian tragedy caused by the fighting between the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Ugandan rebels of the Allied Democratic Forces/National Army for the Liberation of Uganda. In this context, we welcome the decision taken by the Mission on 19 July to establish an advanced outpost in Mutwanga and to set up a temporary base there in order to increase security in the area and allow for the deployment of personnel and the distribution of humanitarian aid in secure conditions.

My delegation encourages the international community to provide the various missions with financial and material resources commensurate with the situation and developments on the ground and to work for constructive dialogue with host countries. Furthermore, my country advocates for the language factor to be taken into account when choosing force commanders, for greater collaboration with regional and subregional organizations, and for greater attention to be paid to aspects relating to prevention.

I should like to pay tribute to General Obiakor for his excellent work with the United Nations over these past years, and I wish him every success in his future endeavours.

Mr. Ebner (Austria): Austria strongly welcomes your initiative, Sir, to organize the present debate, which allows the Council to interact directly with United Nations force commanders.

I should like to thank Under-Secretary-General Le Roy for his introduction. I should also like to take this opportunity to welcome the Force Commanders present here today and to thank them for their very interesting presentations. Austria would like to thank all force commanders of the United Nations for their commitment and important work in the field. We also appreciate the presence of Lieutenant General Obiakor.

In recent discussions in the Security Council on United Nations peacekeeping, one of the key recurring issues has been the need for the Council to provide peacekeeping missions with clear, credible and achievable mandates oriented to a desired outcome and matched with adequate resources for the fulfilment of all mandated tasks. Benchmarks and a clear prioritization of tasks have proved useful for the

Council to better track progress made in the implementation of peacekeeping mandates.

In order to be able to respond in a timely and appropriate manner to developments on the ground, the Council needs to have all relevant information at its disposal. Briefings by force commanders and military experts provide accurate information on the real-life challenges peacekeeping missions are facing, and thus are indispensable to the decision-making of the Council. We also welcome the fact that troop- and police-contributors are participating in today's discussion.

The success and credibility of United Nations peacekeeping will also depend on how far missions can effectively discharge their mandates and thus live up to the expectations raised within the population. With the growing complexity of tasks entrusted to peacekeeping missions and the scarcity of resources, we are confronted with serious capability gaps, including in terms of civilian support capacities. These gaps may jeopardize the success and reputation of United Nations peacekeeping.

More consistent information on mission-specific capability gaps and the impact of those gaps on the implementation of the mandated tasks can help to effectively utilize the gap lists of each peacekeeping operation and to mobilize Member States' support to address them. We therefore appreciate the efforts of Japan as Chair of the Security Council Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations in this regard. Equally, we support the capability-driven approach outlined in the New Horizon non-paper, which concentrates on skills, capacity and equipment, with a special focus on potential resource gaps. This is not only in the interests of the effectiveness of missions, but is also essential to the safety and security of peacekeepers.

Strengthening early warning and crisis prevention capacity is another aspect that deserves more attention in our work in the Council. Both mission leadership and the Council need to receive all relevant information and assessments on early warning, which would allow for a response to emerging crisis situations in a preventive manner. Missions have come up with several inventive approaches, including the joint protection teams in the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), designed not only to provide information gathering and analytical support, but also to facilitate context-specific civil and military measures to protect civilians and liaise with local authorities. Such outreach activities foster interaction with the local population and yield valuable information for an accurate assessment of the circumstances on the ground. We would be interested in hearing more from the field about the potential to strengthen missions' capacities in this regard.

We welcome the fact that protection mandates increasingly include all activities aimed at ensuring the safety and physical integrity of civilian populations, securing humanitarian access and ensuring full respect for the rights of individuals by all parties to conflict, in accordance with international humanitarian and human rights law.

The ultimate goal of any peacekeeping mission with a protection mandate must be to help restore an environment in which the host State is able to fully exercise its primary responsibility to protect its own population. Creating a favourable protection environment goes beyond the protection of civilians from physical violence and must be complemented by activities in the fields of security sector reform; disarmament, demobilization and reintegration; the rule of law; transitional justice; human rights; and the empowerment of local societies. This would also facilitate the transition to sustainable peacebuilding and State-building.

Early coordination of these activities and a common strategy among all actors involved, including civil society, will be crucial for success. The untimely drawdown or premature downscaling of peacekeeping missions can seriously endanger a country's stability and the safety of the civilian population. Mandate-adjustment or the drawdown of missions also needs to be conditioned upon on the fulfilment of benchmarks relating to the protection of civilians, and we encourage the further development of such benchmarks.

Armed groups attacking the civilian population, in particular women and children, do not respect international borders, which have become porous over years of conflict and due to the lack of control. The cross-border cooperation of United Nations peacekeeping missions in adjoining of responsibility is required in order to effectively tackle these threats. For instance, we believe that the problem of the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) needs to be addressed further by drawing up a comprehensive strategy that includes

Governments in the region and all relevant United Nations missions, including MONUSCO, which is mandated to ensure the protection of the civilian population in the LRA-affected areas of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

We would appreciate hearing more about synergies and potential further cooperation in this regard. Equally, we would be grateful for suggestions as to how missions can contribute to the fight against the impunity for perpetrators of such violence.

Mrs. Ogwu (Nigeria): I want to thank you, Sir, for having convened this important debate on peacekeeping. I should also like to thank Mr. Alain Le Roy, Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations; Military Adviser Lieutenant General Chikadibia Obiakor; and the five Force Commanders drawn from different operational fields who have briefed us today. This is a most welcome development in the interaction of the Secretariat with the Security Council. Let me especially commend the field commanders for their inestimable sacrifices in leading the various peace missions.

Peacekeeping continues to evolve, and it has grown in terms of both scope and complexity. I will, however, limit my comments to six key points in my contribution to this debate.

First, we welcome the meetings of the Council with troop- and police-contributing countries. Since the commencement of these meetings, value has been added in terms of mandate-setting, planning and operations in the field by peacekeeping missions. The next step is for the Council to interact more closely with Force Commanders in order to better understand the operational challenges. Feedback from the field, we believe, will enhance the Council's appreciation of the results achieved and, indeed, will improve the precision of peacekeeping mandates. In saying this, we reiterate the need for all mandates to be clear, credible and achievable. There should be an exit strategy, linked to the core objective of each mission. Exit for its own sake, without achievement of the set objective, would be counterproductive.

Secondly, considering the gaps between capabilities, capacities and mandates, there is a need to strike the right balance between supply and demand. Twenty-first-century peacekeepers face the challenges of balancing the long-term outlook of a strategy with the need to implement an effective exit strategy, as well as to maintain goodwill among civilians in incredibly demanding and complex crisis scenarios. To balance this equation, the quality of personnel, equipment and finance must be commensurate with operational mandates and objectives. Moreover, the cultural context of deployment should always be borne in mind, to avoid unnecessary conflict with host countries and communities.

There is also a need to provide pre-deployment training to prepare peacekeeping personnel for their missions. Pre-deployment training has been integrated into the preparation of Nigeria's peacekeeping personnel. In addition, we maintain a forward operations base in Abuja to ensure the adequate preparation of our peacekeepers. In fact, only last month, the Nigerian Army Peacekeeping Centre in Jaji, Kaduna, was certified by the United Nations for peacekeeping training purposes. It is our intention to make it a centre of excellence and the training hub for peacekeeping personnel from Nigeria, States members of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and other African countries.

Thirdly, forging partnerships within and outside the United Nations system is imperative for effective peacekeeping. It is not possible for the United Nations, acting alone, to meet the needs of all its peacekeeping missions. Therefore, seeking bilateral and other forms of assistance would complement the efforts to address critical gaps in peacekeeping. The need to involve regional and subregional organizations in this regard cannot be overstated. Concerted efforts should be made to enhance, diversify and update the roster of peacekeeping personnel, giving consideration as a matter of policy to geographical balance in the appointment of senior peacekeeping personnel in relevant fields.

Fourthly, achieving coherence and coordination between the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Field Support will have a positive impact in the field. But coordination and coherence should not be limited to Headquarters; it should, ideally, also permeate United Nations country teams, the donor community and other actors in peacekeeping. Such coherence would result in better safety and effectiveness and in the rapid deployment of peacekeepers. A situation where peacekeepers continue to live in substandard settlement conditions long after their arrival at their duty posts does not augur well for productivity or morale.

Fifthly, during its debate on 16 July, on preventive diplomacy (see S/PV.6360 and S/PRST/2010/14), the Security Council recognized the increased material, human and financial resources required by peacekeeping operations over the past decade. The Council accordingly acknowledged potential benefits and efficiencies that could be achieved through an integrated approach to preventive diplomacy efforts similar to the approach to peacekeeping and peacebuilding methods. The nexus between peacekeeping and peacebuilding was embedded in the Council's acknowledgement of the interrelationship between political, security, development, human rights and rule of law activities.

At the heart of most conflicts are matters of deprivation, injustice, inequitable distribution of resources, bad governance and other forms of abuse. Effective peacekeeping must therefore integrate peacebuilding strategies. The Peacebuilding Commission has an important role to play in that regard.

Sixthly, there is no gainsaying that prompt and adequate compensation for contingent-owned equipment, apart from catalysing the participation of other potential troop-contributing countries, demonstrates recognition and appreciation of the sacrifices which troop-contributing countries are continuously called upon to make.

Finally, it is important to strengthen both the mandates and the rules of engagement of peacekeepers, with a view to increasing their safety. Situations where peacekeepers are killed or obstructed by spoilers of a peace process should be examined closely. Adequate measures, including deterrence and severe targeted sanctions, are needed to ensure the safety of all peacekeeping personnel. The Council should declare zero tolerance for impunity for acts committed against peacekeepers.

Nigeria remains committed to the ideals of the United Nations, and in particular to its peacekeeping role. We will continue to make sacrifices to contribute meaningfully to the maintenance of international peace and security. While it is unlikely that the need for peacekeepers will be extinguished in the very near future, that hope remains. In the final analysis, durable peace can be achieved only through inclusive dialogue, reconciliation and integration. The United Nations must play a central role in defining and promoting a comprehensive strategy comprising operational and structural measures for preventing or addressing the root causes of armed conflict, in order to ensure sustainable global peace. That is the ideal for which the United Nations was created.

Mr. Heller (Mexico) (*spoke in Spanish*): We thank you, Mr. President, for having organized this meeting. We thank Mr. Alain Le Roy, Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, and the commanders of the peacekeeping operations in Haiti, Liberia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Sudan and of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization for their briefings. We also welcome the presence of the Military Adviser of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. The participation of the commanders of all these operations is, to a great extent, a reflection of the way in which the mandates of peacekeeping operations have developed over the history of the Organization.

We welcome the convening of today's meeting in the hope that such meetings will become a regular practice in the activities of the Security Council, taking advantage of the annual meeting of commanders of peacekeeping operations and fostering greater coherence between what takes place on the ground and what takes place within the Security Council. Clearly, my delegation is most grateful to all the personnel of peacekeeping operations for their invaluable work on behalf of the international community to protect international peace and security.

As a result of lessons learned in recent years, it has been acknowledged that peacekeeping operations must take account of certain fundamental elements if they are to meet their primary objective of achieving sustainable peace. Among these, we underscore the following: the preparation of clear, credible and achievable mandates with sufficient material, military, police and civilian resources to carry out their functions; the unequivocal commitment of the parties involved to achieve a peaceful solution to the conflict; the existence of a comprehensive peace agreement that addresses the structural causes of the conflict; and the understanding by the parties and the general population of the benefits of achieving the mission's objectives, which they must assume as their own.

There is consensus on the need to establish time-bound objectives at all stages, including transition and exit strategies; a comprehensive approach to

peacekeeping missions with priorities for peacebuilding established at an early stage; and an efficient planning and coordination mechanism which includes the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and those entrusted with coordinating and leading the military, civilian, financial and humanitarian components of a mission. The conceptual correlations are clear, and at times we end up repeating the obvious. However, the difficulties faced on the ground and the resulting need to adapt mandates which can be multidimensional and extremely complex require that the Security Council and the Organization as a whole adopt pragmatic actions and strategies that have impact in the short term.

My delegation is aware of the difficulties faced by peacekeeping operations in complying fully with their mandates, which include such diverse tasks as supporting political dialogue between the parties, strengthening human rights and the rule of law, security sector reform and protection of civilians, in addition to facing natural emergencies, organized crime and, in some cases, attacks against their personnel.

The briefings we heard today indicate the challenges in such diverse situations. In that sense, it is essential to ensure a country's cooperation with the peacekeeping operation throughout its stay, since a successful transition to a peacebuilding phase depends upon it. The cases of the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT) and the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) have provided us with lessons, but also important questions for the future.

We also need to guarantee firm political support by the United Nations, its representatives and the Security Council for operations on the ground. The legitimacy of the Organization is the main asset of a peacekeeping operation. And often the actors on the ground try to disregard this and involve the Organization in the dynamics of the conflict as if it were another participant in that conflict, often hampering its freedom of movement, politicizing its actions or placing it in risky situations, sometimes with fatal consequences. Here, we underscore our rejection of any attack against United Nations personnel and we reiterate the importance of full respect for resolution 1502 (2003), on the protection of United Nations personnel, associated personnel and humanitarian personnel in conflict zones.

On the situation in Haiti in particular, we reaffirm our support for the work of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), which has without question been essential for the survival of institutions and the people of the country in tragic circumstances. This case has put the Organization and its response capacity on the ground to the test. We consider strengthening the police contingent of the Mission, following the adoption of resolution 1927 (2010), to be an important step so that it can continue supporting the Haitian authorities in strengthening their own police force and providing them with the necessary assistance, within the Mission mandate, to ensure the maintenance of stability, as well as continuing to provide assistance in strengthening national institutions, electoral processes, reconstruction, stability and social development.

In the case of the Sudan, as has been noted, it is clear that the international community's attention must be focused on preparations for the referendum. Logistical and security support, which the United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS) can provide, is essential for ensuring complete and peaceful participation. Notwithstanding that and aware of the resources available to UNMIS, we must not forget that all efforts must include the protection of civilians and the facilitation of the provision of humanitarian assistance, since these are both complementary to the success of the voting and the peace process.

The escalation of tensions following the holding of elections represents a new challenge to the Southern Sudan Administration and UNMIS as they head towards the holding of a referendum. The role of UNMIS military personnel will be key in coming months, and that is why we reaffirm our full support for the preparatory work now under way, in particular the contingency and strategy plans outlined by Special Representative Menkerios based on the priority objectives.

In the Middle East, the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization plays an important role, and it could be even more significant in the future given the nature of the conflict in the region.

The Security Council must closely follow the situations faced by a peacekeeping operation so that timely changes may be made to the mandate, such as on logistical and operational capacities, seeking always to respond to events on the ground and, thus, to

provide tools and clear objectives for the work of mission personnel. A peacekeeping operation is part of the political solution to a conflict, but it does not replace such a solution. Hence, it is also important to bolster activities on the ground with parallel efforts to strengthen preventive diplomacy, early warning, conflict solution and mediation efforts, focusing always on national priorities and national actors, thus contributing to a country's development in order to guarantee lasting peace and the well-being of its people. Paying attention to these aspects must be one of our priorities if we wish to stabilize conflicts and guarantee international security.

Mr. Sumi (Japan): At the outset, I thank you, Mr. President, for convening this meeting today. I would also like to thank Mr. Le Roy and the force commanders for their useful briefings. Our thanks go to Lieutenant General Sikander Afzal, Lieutenant General Babacar Gaye, Major General Moses Bisong Obi, Major General Robert Mood and Major General Luiz Guilherme Paul Cruz. I also welcome the presence of Lieutenant General Chikadibia Isaac Obiakor, Military Adviser in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations.

Japan takes this opportunity to extend its wholehearted appreciation to and respect for the Force Commanders and all the peacekeepers in each mission who are tirelessly doing the invaluable work of United Nations peacekeeping operations.

One of the most important issues facing United Nations peacekeeping is to fill the gaps between mission mandates and implementation. In this regard, today's exercise, in which the Council is listening directly to the voices of the field commanders, is quite beneficial, since it reduces the distance between the Security Council and the field and facilitates the sharing of best practices among missions. Japan welcomes this practice and hopes that it will be continued in the future.

From a practical perspective, Japan has comments and questions on three points: strengthening cooperation between the Council and the field, implementing peacekeeping operation mandates, and strengthening the integration of missions.

I should like to begin by pointing out that each United Nations peacekeeping mission faces different circumstances and that each mandate is the result of the discussions formed by the different positions of Council members. Thus, each Security Council resolution tends to contain different language for the same mandate, although these may sometimes be merely nuanced differences. Japan emphasizes the importance for the intentions of each resolution to be clear, understandable and reflected in the concept of operations and other means of communication during implementation. At the same time, it should be noted that the Council needs to listen to the voices from United Nations peacekeeping operations, including those of field commanders, and reflect these views in the establishment of clear and achievable mandates.

However, the current situation is not always satisfactory in this regard. Although the Council undertakes such endeavours as briefings by the Secretariat before and after technical assessment missions and holds private meetings with troop- and police-contributing countries before its consultations, this is not enough to achieve mutual understanding between the Council and the peacekeeping operations in the field. Therefore, in order to further enhance such understanding, I should like to propose that the Security Council conduct future dialogues similar to today's initiative.

Secondly, I should like to touch upon issues regarding the implementation of mandates, such as information-gathering and capability gaps. In order to effectively implement complex mandates, especially with respect to the protection of civilians, timely and accurate local information and its analysis are crucial. However, many peacekeeping missions lack this ability. There is no silver bullet for resolving this problem, but sufficient discussions should be held among the Council's members, as well as through meetings with force commanders and in the General Assembly.

Japan would like to see further discussion of the United Nations information collection and analysis capabilities, in accordance with basic principles of United Nations peacekeeping operations, such as impartiality and respect for the ownership of the host country. Japan should also like to see this expertise developed in the mid- to long terms. In the short term, comprehensive endeavours should be made to make full use of existing capabilities and resources — similar to what has been done in the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), which strengthened its communications with the local

populace regarding the protection of civilians and joint mission analysis centres — in each mission. In this context, I should like to ask about what kind of discussion took place in yesterday's meeting of the Force Commander to that end.

The Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations, which Japan has chaired since last year, has been discussing the broader issue of the capability gap over the past half-year. Its interim report, which summarizes these discussions, lays out the Working Group's intention to hold meetings later this year in order to consider ways to use the gap list more effectively, including with respect to the shortage of utility helicopters. The gap list has already been circulated to all Member States. I should like to hear from the Commanders about what part of their mandates they find most difficult and challenging to implement with regard to the gap list.

Last but not least, with regard to the protection of civilians and humanitarian support, Japan would like to point out the importance of civilian-military cooperation, such as that of MONUSCO's joint protection team, and of strengthening coordination between military and civilian components while preserving the impartiality of humanitarian organizations. At the same time, it is important to enhance coordination between military and police, especially formed police units, such as for the internally displaced persons camps and their surroundings in Darfur. Japan would like to ask about what kind of discussion took place in this regard in yesterday's meeting and what the Secretariat thinks are the challenges to strengthening the integration of the missions.

The President (*spoke in Russian*): I would urge members of the Council to use the presence of the Force Commanders at this meeting as an opportunity to ask any specific questions they may have with respect to the challenges they are currently facing.

Mrs. Dunlop (Brazil): I thank your delegation, Mr. President, for organizing this debate and Under-Secretary-General Alain Le Roy for his briefing. We welcome the presence of Lieutenant General Obiakor among us today. I would also like to thank Major General Paul Cruz, Lieutenant General Babacar Gaye, Lieutenant General Sikander Afzal, Major General Moses Bisong Obi and Major General Robert Mood for their remarks. Taken together, they reflect many of the achievements of and evolving challenges to United Nations peacekeeping today. Our guests, along with all the other Force Commanders and mission leaders, deserve our deep and heartfelt gratitude for the extraordinary job they do in the most difficult circumstances.

The presence of Force Commanders in the Council today brings to the fore the obvious but fundamental truth that peacekeeping happens on the ground. We must trust our mission leaders and not micromanage them, but we can and should give missions the strategic guidance and multifaceted support they need. In this regard, today I will focus on where we stand and how we see the way forward in three critical areas: the protection of civilians, interaction between peacekeeping and peacebuilding, and field support.

The past year has seen a wealth of conceptual development and political support for the protection of civilians in such documents as the joint independent study of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, resolution 1894 (2009), and the report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations. The focus now should be on producing concrete results on the ground. This is normally a daunting task, as evidenced by the cases of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur, but one the Organization must perform to the best of its ability.

In that context, priority should be given to the preparation of a strategic framework to guide mission leaders in setting up comprehensive protection strategies, which are needed to ensure that the protection of civilians is seen not as a solely military task, but rather as a mission-wide endeavour. Some of the most successful peacekeeping missions have been those where peacebuilding concerns have been most closely integrated into the mission's work. Nevertheless, we still need to develop greater clarity on how peacekeepers can best contribute to peacebuilding.

Over the next 12 months, important documents will be released, including the strategy of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) for the early delivery of peacebuilding tasks by

peacekeepers; the World Bank's report on conflict, security and development; and the review of international civilian capacities. We must use those opportunities to hold a detailed discussion on peacebuilding and peacekeeping, just as we did on the protection of civilians. That discussion should be action-oriented and aim at achieving three main goals by August 2011: first, a better understanding of the relationship between security and development; secondly, a clearer picture of how peacekeeping and peacebuilding have interacted on the ground, both in current and in older missions; and, thirdly, a practical agenda for the way forward that identifies the main challenges in the areas of field guidance, interactive coordination and capacity development.

The global field support strategy received careful consideration and approval from both the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations and the Fifth Committee. My delegation applauds the efforts of Under-Secretary-General Susana Malcorra and her team to guarantee that Member States are fully engaged in this process through retreats, briefings and workshops. That level of interaction must be maintained in the coming months, both with delegations in New York and with contingents and mission leaders. That is key to ensuring that all stakeholders fully understand the impact of the proposed changes.

In taking forward the global field support strategy, the Secretariat should continue to bear in mind that logistical aspects of peacekeeping missions can directly impact their ability to fulfil their mandates. That, in turn, relates directly to the Council's effectiveness in addressing threats to international peace and security. For instance, modelization can allow civilian personnel to be safely deployed at an early stage, with potentially important benefits to our efforts to bring stability to a given region or country. In that connection, efficiency gains mean a safer world. That is where the strategy's ultimate significance lies.

Before I conclude, I would like to refer to the seminar entitled "A new horizon for United Nations peacekeeping: perspectives from the South", which was held in Rio de Janeiro in June. The seminar made a practical contribution to our collective thinking on how best to face the dilemmas of twenty-first century peacekeeping. Issues such as the linkage between peacekeeping and peacebuilding, the use of force and relations between missions and local populations were thoroughly discussed. One of the key conclusions reached at Rio — the summary of which will soon be circulated to Member States — was that exit strategies must be based on effective staying strategies, in the sense not of over-staying but of ensuring that a mission's achievements are preserved and built upon. We believe that the current efforts in the Organization being led by DPKO to improve peacekeeping go precisely in that direction. Brazil will continue to contribute to that endeavour.

Mr. De Rivière (France) (*spoke in French*): First of all, I would like to thank you, Mr. President, for your initiative to organize this meeting. I should also like to thank the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations and the Force Commanders of the peacekeeping missions represented here for providing a clear perspective of their efforts on the ground.

As the Security Council is aware, France wants very much to participate in improving the functioning of peacekeeping operations. Since they were first established, such operations have been a valuable tool in helping the United Nations to respond to the major task assigned us by the Charter — maintaining international peace and security. We are also keen to improve their effectiveness and, as a result, their strategic importance.

To that end, during our presidency of the Security Council in January 2009, we launched an initiative with the British Mission whose goal was to improve the Council's political and military follow-up to peacekeeping operations, ensure more effective management of administrative, logistical and financial aspects of missions, and further develop doctrines on complex peacekeeping issues such as protecting civilians and peacebuilding.

We have made progress on that whole host of issues thanks to the consideration everyone has given to the questions concerned, far beyond the confines of the Security Council, thanks to the Secretariat's New Horizon non-paper and the August 2009 and February 2010 presidential statements (S/PRST/2009/24 and S/PRST/2010/2), as well as the work done by the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations. We would also like to welcome the green light given to the global support strategy, which France will monitor closely to ensure that it results in the necessary improvements in mission support.

We shall in particular pursue our efforts to strengthen the operational chain of command, improve cooperation with troop and police personnel contributors and provide more rigorous financial follow-up of peacekeeping operations. Operational budgets have indeed grown exponentially in recent years. We need to consider how to manage those budgets responsibly. The results achieved with regard to financing peacekeeping operations at the most recent session of the Fifth Committee demonstrate that such concerns are increasingly being taken into account. We have no doubt that the Secretariat will step up its efforts in that regard.

The perspective developed on the ground by mission heads is essential. I should therefore like them to share with us their thoughts on how their working methods and their relationship with Headquarters have evolved in the past two years. What do they think could be done to improve the functioning of peacekeeping operations? In particular, I should like to know their views on the following issues.

An exercise was launched to consider the protection of civilians following the issuance of the joint study requested by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, in June 2010. To that end, operational documents were developed to allow peacekeeping operations to translate into deed the mandates we give to them to protect civilians. The United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur and the United Nations Mission in the Sudan have now developed protection strategies, which the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) is currently implementing. What main conclusions have been drawn? What are the primary difficulties facing operations in discharging their civilian protection mandate?

With regard to MINUSTAH, the January earthquake forced it to take on tasks that are not usually part of a peacekeeping operation's tasks. In particular, that has included improving its engineering capacities to clear rubble, restore basic infrastructure and so on. What conclusions have the Force Commanders drawn from the involvement of those engineering capacities?

Working alongside Congolese armed forces, MONUSCO is undertaking several military operations in the eastern part of the country. The Security Council has asked the Mission to develop a specific and limited system for providing conditional support. How do the Commanders believe that this support, which henceforth will be more limited and focused only on certain battalions, will contribute both to improving civilian protection and to facilitating or hindering their disarmament, demobilization and reintegration mandate?

Lastly, with regard to the United Nations Mission in Liberia, how is the Force Commander preparing for its inevitable drawdown and what are the lessons learned from the transition from peacekeeping to peacebuilding? Where does the mission of the peacekeeping forces end?

Before I conclude, I would like to commend General Obiakor, as others have, thank him for his work at the head of the Office of Military Affairs, and wish him every success as he continues his career.

Mr. Mugoya (Uganda): I thank you, Sir, for convening this important debate on peacekeeping operations. I thank Under-Secretary-General Mr. Le Roy for his briefing and the respective Force Commanders of the United Nations Mission in Liberia, the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), the United Nations Mission in the Sudan, the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization and the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti for their very insightful briefings.

From the outset, I would like to commend the Force Commanders, their officers and staff for the selfless and gallant service they render in the maintenance of peace and security in their respective areas of operation. I would also like to thank Lieutenant General Obiakor, the Military Adviser for Peacekeeping Operations, for his service to the United Nations and wish him success in his future endeavours.

My delegation welcomes this interactive meeting with the Force Commanders. While we acknowledge the many successes that United Nations peacekeeping has achieved over the years, it is also clear that there are existing and emerging challenges that have to be addressed. This debate therefore provides an opportunity for the Council to better appreciate the challenges that peacekeeping operations face on the

ground. We are convinced that, by addressing the challenges identified, peacekeeping operations will become more effective tools in the maintenance of international peace and security.

Peacekeeping operations today have multifaceted mandates. As we have heard from the various briefings, the tasks range from the promotion of dialogue and reconciliation among the parties to conflict, to the protection of civilians, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants, security sector reform, supporting electoral processes, promoting human rights and restoring the rule of law. This brings together a number of participants from various backgrounds to perform these interrelated functions and calls for careful planning and coordination.

There have been cases of mismatch between peacekeeping mandates in dynamic mission environments and the provision of adequate or appropriate resources. In other instances, inordinate delays in the deployment of peacekeeping operations have resulted in the escalation of conflict and loss of lives, affecting the credibility of the United Nations in the eyes of the affected population.

We commend the ongoing initiatives for inter-mission cooperation in addressing the challenges, including the protection of civilians, in close cooperation with the national and regional authorities. My delegation would appreciate hearing from the Force Commander of MONUSCO on the extent of cooperation amongst peacekeeping operations in the region to combat the threat of the Lord's Resistance Army, what challenges the peacekeeping operations face and what more could be done.

What is needed to enhance the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations is greater commitment on the part of Member States and other stakeholders to providing the requisite logistical, financial and human resources. There is a need for renewed impetus and political will to ensure support for more expeditious deployments with the requisite human resources, assets and logistics. It is also essential that the concerned parties cooperate with and render full support to peacekeeping operations in the implementation of their mandates. The United Nations should also strengthen further its strategic partnership with regional and subregional organizations to take advantage of their proximity and capabilities.

Uganda reiterates the need for early peacebuilding activities within peacekeeping missions. This, in our view, creates the conditions for efforts to sustainably address the root causes of conflict through peacebuilding.

Finally, my delegation pays tribute to the memory of the peacekeepers who have paid the ultimate price, sacrificing their lives in efforts to make this world a more peaceful one.

Mrs. DiCarlo (United States of America): I thank you, Mr. President, for organizing this very informative and useful debate. Let me also thank Under-Secretary-General Le Roy for his introductory remarks and the Force Commanders for their briefings. I would also like to commend Lieutenant General Obiakor for his service and wish him well in his future endeavours.

My delegation welcomes all the Force Commanders here today and, on behalf of the United States, offers our deep appreciation for their service. We recognize the tremendous sacrifices they and their troops make. They deserve our full support.

In its presidential statement of August 2009 (S/PRST/2009/24), the Council recommitted itself to improving the overall performance of peacekeeping and to addressing the challenges it faces today.

First, we committed to providing peacekeeping operations with credible and achievable mandates. The United States believes that mandates and means must be better aligned and that we must be realistic about what we can achieve. The Council committed to ensuring that missions have the resources and capabilities needed to effectively implement mandates. That is why we must keep on our collective agenda the need to address chronic shortages of enabling capabilities, including transport, helicopter, engineering and medical units. We also need to increase the pool of well-trained, well-equipped and highly disciplined troops and police available for peacekeeping operations.

Through the United States Global Peace Operations Initiative, the United States continues to provide training and equipment for potential peacekeepers. We stand ready to provide expertise as needed to enhance United Nations missions. Further, there is ample scope for the Secretariat to improve the administrative and logistics support it provides to United Nations peacekeeping forces. We thus welcome

the General Assembly's recent positive response to key elements of the global field support strategy, which we hope will make early deployment and ongoing support faster and more efficient.

Secondly, in addition to addressing mandate and means, the United States believes it vital to continue to improve the performance of United Nations peacekeeping missions. This Council is improving its ability to measure progress in the implementation of complex mandates through the use of benchmarks tailored to each conflict and reviewed periodically for their viability, but we can do better.

Also, we believe it essential to strengthen the body of guidance and training available to United Nations peacekeeping missions, particularly regarding when to use conciliatory or confrontational tactics in the face of threats to civilians or United Nations personnel, obstacles to freedom of movement, or direct challenges to the implementation of mandates. Civilian personnel also need enhanced guidance, training and support for the implementation of peacemaking and peacebuilding tasks central to successful exit strategies. We urge the Secretariat, Member States, troop-contributing countries and the Council to continue to work together toward these goals.

Thirdly, we also made clear in our statement that peacekeeping operations must be accompanied by — and not a substitute for — critical peacemaking and peacebuilding efforts. The United States has been engaged and will continue engaging intensively on fragile peace processes where key United Nations peacekeeping missions are deployed. We are concurrently exploring ways to enhance our support to the work of the Peacebuilding Commission.

Fourthly, we stress the importance of ongoing institutional reform and of strengthening not only the United Nations but also regional organizations' capacity to plan, deploy, manage, evaluate and successfully complete peacekeeping operations.

The United States is committed to following through on these commitments and has made strengthening United Nations peacekeeping one of our top priorities at the United Nations. The insights of the Force Commanders here today are most helpful to us as we consider renewing mission mandates and establishing new missions. We ask for their continued leadership in employing all the tools and resources at their disposal to make their missions successful.

My Government believes that success includes retaining the trust, respect and confidence of the host population in whose midst peacekeepers are deployed. The United States therefore welcomes the steps that the commanders have taken to address issues of conduct and discipline. We urge all commanders to be stalwart in carrying out the policy of zero tolerance for sexual exploitation and abuse.

On a distinct but related note, we were gratified by the launch this week of guidelines for integrating a gender perspective into the work of the military in United Nations peacekeeping operations. We thank the generals for their professionalism, dedication and courage. We remain grateful that they have answered the call to protect the vulnerable and promote a more peaceful world.

If I may, I have a couple of specific questions. One is to General Cruz of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). We remain concerned about the incidents of sexual and gender-based violence within internally displaced persons settlements and wonder what steps MINUSTAH could take to address this scourge further.

Also, given the historic ties between my country and Liberia, we are particularly aware of the enormous contribution of the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) to Liberia's stability. General Afzal mentioned the challenges posed by the upcoming elections, and as we prepare to discuss renewal of the Mission's mandate in September, we would appreciate his perspective on any particular challenges he anticipates in supporting these elections.

Mr. Wang Min (China) (*spoke in Chinese*): My delegation welcomes the initiative of the Russian delegation to convene today's meeting and thanks Under-Secretary-General Alain Le Roy for his briefing. We have also listened attentively to the thought-provoking briefings of the five Force Commanders of United Nations peacekeeping operations. In particular, I warmly welcome all the Force Commanders present at today's meeting of the Council. They work under harsh conditions throughout the world to carry out the noble responsibilities entrusted to them by the Security Council and have made special contributions to the maintenance of international peace and security. The Chinese delegation pays tribute to them and to the Blue Helmets deployed worldwide.

I shall highlight three points in my statement. First, United Nations peacekeeping operations must have an inclusive, strong and viable political process to back them up. In circumstances where there is no peace to keep, the most that a peacekeeping mission can accomplish in carrying out its responsibilities, including the protection of civilians, humanitarian assistance and reconstruction and development, is to play the role of firefighter, which is unsustainable.

At present, the deployment of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) is nearing completion. However, the political process continues to face serious difficulties. Last week, the Council adopted resolution 1935 (2010) extending UNAMID's mandate and requesting it, among other things, to prioritize the promotion of the political process in Darfur. This not only demonstrated the international community's dual-track strategy in Darfur, but also complemented and reinforced the two tracks. We hope that the objective embodied in resolution 1935 (2010) will be implemented.

Secondly, the main purpose of deploying peacekeeping operations is to help countries in conflict to stabilize the security situation and take responsibility for their own defence, security and governance. From the first day of deployment, a peacekeeping operation should formulate and gradually improve its exit strategy. This strategy should focus not only on the eventual withdrawal of a peacekeeping operation, but also and more importantly on effective interface with peacebuilding to promote the eventual smooth transition from peacekeeping to peacebuilding.

Peacekeeping operations in Sierra Leone, Liberia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo have provided the Council with rich experience. We hope to hear more views and suggestions from the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and the Force Commanders on how to achieve the strategic benchmarks of peacekeeping operations.

Thirdly, United Nations peacekeeping operations have exhibited a tendency to grow in size and to assume multiple functions. While their logistical systems lag behind, peacekeeping operations face such challenges as mission deployment and inefficient operations. My delegation welcomes the series of studies by the Secretariat in this regard. We believe that United Nations peacekeeping operations mandates should be mission specific, in line with specific circumstances. They should be more focused and flexible. When discussing the deployment of peacekeeping operations or adjustment of mandates, the Council should listen fully to the views of the special representatives of the Secretary-General, military commanders and military and civilian experts.

Mr. Parham (United Kingdom): I warmly thank Under-Secretary-General Le Roy and the Force Commanders for their briefings. Let me take this opportunity to pay tribute to the work of the Force Commanders, both those who briefed us and all the others who are here today, and to the work of all of the women and men who are under their command, frequently, as we know, in very challenging circumstances and at great personal risk.

As part of our collective efforts to strengthen the Council's role in peacekeeping, in our presidential statement of 5 August 2009 (S/PRST/2009/24), adopted almost exactly a year ago, we acknowledged the need to improve access to military advice. Since then, we have made some progress, but more can be done to improve the Council's understanding of the operational demands placed on troops and police by the peacekeeping resolutions we draft. If we are going to write realistic and achievable mandates, we need the best possible understanding of what is achievable. We therefore very much welcome the fact, Sir, that you have arranged this meeting today.

That is also the reason why the United Kingdom supported changes to improve consultation and interaction with troop and police contributors in the lead-up to mandate renewal or change, and it is why we support the convening of joint political and military expert meetings to discuss peacekeeping operations, in particular before the United Nations dispatches a technical assessment mission. It is also why we are willing to explore ways to make the Military Staff Committee more inclusive and relevant, in order to help us make decisions that enable peacekeepers to implement their mandates fully.

The ground has already been very well covered by other speakers, but I just have a few comments and questions for the Force Commanders. First of all, we heard from a number of them about the challenge of protecting civilians and the fact that in order to achieve protection of civilian mandates, the forces need more agility and more mobility. But at the same time, they face a shortage of air assets and problems over freedom

of movement. So my question on this, for the Force Commanders, is whether or not better technology and intelligence could be an appropriate and effective force multiplier to help them achieve those protection of civilian mandates.

Secondly, with respect to robust peacekeeping or deterrents, robustness in peacekeeping is, of course, a sensitive concept, but we are not talking here about peace enforcement. Nevertheless, in order to be effective in today's highly complex peacekeeping environment, United Nations missions must have the capacity and the will to deter those who would derail the peace process or threaten civilians and United Nations peacekeepers.

As a team from my delegation saw at first hand recently in Haiti, when the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) patrols the streets of Cité Soleil in Port-au-Prince each night, Brazilian troops demonstrate a credibly robust posture that deters any would-be attackers. That is a conscious and deliberate tactic — one which has created an environment in which other United Nations agencies and international organizations can operate safely without the need for armed escort.

Earlier this year, the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations expressed its support for this sort of deterrent posture. I would be interested to hear the force commanders' views on this as a concept and on the ability or otherwise of their own missions to establish such deterrence.

On quick impact projects and reconstruction: clearly, there are circumstances where peacekeeping operations should get involved in such projects and in reconstruction, not least in the early stages, to establish credibility with the local communities. But we need to make sure that our peacekeepers' willingness to help does not crowd out those agencies better placed or better funded to support early recovery and reconstruction. We need to know that activities undertaken in the short term will not prejudice long-term sustainable development.

Where international peacekeepers provide the only viable substitute for local services in the short term, we must make every effort to build up local capacity alongside such service delivery and from the beginning. That is why the United Kingdom argues for strict oversight and for limits to be set on funding for quick impact projects and why we support closer integration among United Nations peacekeeping operations, local Governments and other United Nations agencies, donors and international organizations on the ground.

This area is one that General Cruz touched upon in his very helpful briefing. It would be interesting to hear a bit more from him about how he ensures that the efforts of MINUSTAH on the humanitarian and reconstruction fronts are coordinated with other parts of the United Nations in the field to ensure that there is coherence and that there are no problematic overlaps.

I would like to make a point on security sector reform in Liberia. We heard from General Afzal that progress on security sector reform in Liberia is slow. It would be interesting to hear from him his views on why that is the case and what we can do to address it.

Under the United Kingdom presidency of the Security Council in August last year, we were fortunate to hear from Lieutenant General Agwai, then the Force Commander of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (see S/PV.6178), and it was striking how succinctly and persuasively he cut to the most pertinent challenges faced by that mission at that point. And listening to the force commanders this morning, I was reminded once again of the enormous value of a view from the field. I would like to thank them very much for taking time out of their annual conference to speak to us. I hope that this tradition can be maintained.

Ms. Ziade (Lebanon): At the outset, we would like to express our appreciation to you, Mr. President, for having organized this important debate. We would like to extend our thanks to Under-Secretary-General Alain Le Roy for his introductory remarks and to the Force Commanders of the United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS), the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) and the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), and the Head of Mission and Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), for their respective comprehensive presentations.

Lebanon believes that the success of United Nations peacekeeping operations requires a partnership among the Security Council, the Secretariat, troop-contributing countries and the host country, a partnership that emphasizes the key role of the Special

Committee on Peacekeeping Operations in policy formulation and the Fifth Committee in resource allocation.

We further believe that the main underpinnings of success of United Nations peacekeeping and the transition to peace and development rest on the following elements.

First, peacekeeping should not be an end in itself but rather part of a political solution. Comprehensive resolution of conflicts by dealing with their core causes should remain the objective. The second element is developing clear and achievable mandates matched with the required resources is essential. The third is adherence to the general principles of peacekeeping, namely impartiality and the United Nations Charter principles of sovereignty and political independence. The fourth element is a strong link between peacekeeping and peacebuilding. The fifth is strengthening the role of regional and subregional organizations, in accordance with Chapter VIII of the Charter. Finally, the sixth element is respect for the safety and security of United Nations peacekeepers and positions. Crimes like the 1996 Israeli attack on the quarters of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) in Qana, south Lebanon, and the 2006 Israeli attack on the UNTSO post, also in south of Lebanon, should not be repeated.

After paying careful attention to the presentations of the Force Commanders and the Head of Mission, we would like to express our hope that such direct interaction will continue in the future. Such candid interaction avails us of the opportunity to understand urgent and direct needs from the field and in turn helps us, as the Council, to better respond to those needs.

In this regard, we would like to know from Major General Moses Bisong Obi of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) and Major General Babacar Gaye of MONUSCO about the ongoing cooperation among the United Nations missions in the region: UNMIS, UNAMID, MONUSCO and the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad. What are the tools needed to improve cooperation and the sharing of lessons learned in order to enhance the combating of transborder rebel activities being carried out mainly by the Lord's Resistance Army in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Central African Republic and the south of the Sudan?

In Liberia, we know that UNMIL is concluding the third phase of its drawdown to 2,029 military personnel from its previous level of 9,150. Here, we hope that Lieutentant General Sikander Afzal will tell us more about the risk of a security vacuum as the Mission draws down and about the logistical problems it faces in concluding this drawdown.

With Haiti, we renew our solidarity in the aftermath of the humanitarian tragedy caused by the earthquake. We highly appreciate the efforts of MINUSTAH, particularly in terms of relief and assistance to civilians, as well as peacebuilding efforts. We hope that Major General Luiz Guilherme Paul Cruz can tell us about the major logistical challenges that the United Nations and MINUSTAH are facing in coordinating donor assistance for the relief and rebuilding efforts.

Turning now to my region, an end to the Israeli occupation in Palestine, Syria and the remaining parts of Lebanon — the core cause of the conflict — is a prerequisite to any comprehensive resolution and to the success of United Nations peacekeeping missions in the Middle East. Lebanon fully supports UNIFIL and UNTSO, and the Lebanese Government is strongly committed to the implementation of resolution 1701 (2006) in its entirety. Both UNIFIL and UNTSO enjoy excellent coordination with and cooperation from the Lebanese Government and the Lebanese Armed Forces in carrying out their mandates. We seek one clarification from Major General Robert Mood concerning the current mode of reporting that is undertaken by UNTSO in terms of whether such reporting to Headquarters in New York is done directly or through UNIFIL.

Finally, we salute the dedication, courage and sacrifices of the peacekeepers deployed in peacekeeping operations around the world, and we express our sincere thanks and appreciation to the peoples and Governments of each and every troop-contributing country.

Mr. Apakan (Turkey): I wish to thank you, Mr. President, for organizing this interactive meeting with the force commanders. They are doing an excellent job under truly difficult conditions, and we owe them our deepest gratitude. The insight they bring from the hot spots of operational theatres is very valuable, and we very much appreciate their presence here today. In fact, we have always stressed the need to

improve the Council's access to military advice, not only before mandate approvals and renewals but throughout the whole life cycle of a mission. Today's meeting thus provides a good example, which should continue. I would also like to thank Under-Secretary-General Alain Le Roy for his briefing.

Today, as requested, I will focus on practical issues, but rather than making comments, will limit my intervention to five sets of questions addressed to the Force Commanders.

First, on mandates given by the Council, we all agree that mandates should provide strategic and political guidance that helps to address the operational challenges that missions face in the field. They must also be feasible and realistic, rather than theoretical and overambitious in a way that fails to take into account the limitations of specific missions. Do the Force Commanders believe that is currently the case, and how can the Council better craft mandates that match the situation on the ground and are a better guide in the field? I know that other colleagues have also raised these questions.

Secondly, the linkage between peacekeeping and peacebuilding is crucial to attaining lasting peace. In this regard, peacekeepers are often identified as early peacebuilders. As the practitioners on the ground, do the Commanders feel that way and, if so, are they sufficiently equipped to discharge those peacebuilding responsibilities? If not, who should lead peacebuilding in the field?

The linkage between peacekeeping and peacebuilding is also seen as a reflection of the critical relationship between security and development. That point has been covered by my Brazilian colleague. How do the Commanders see this connection, and do they think there is a sufficient level of coordination and cooperation between peacekeepers and development actors, either on the ground, at the operational level, or here, at Headquarters, at the strategic level?

Thirdly, without capacity no strategic guidance can ensure the achievement of our political and operational objectives. In that respect, what are the most critical capacities that missions lack in the field, and how could that gap be most effectively closed?

Fourthly, the need to improve the quality of consultations with troop- and police-contributing countries is constantly stressed, and we fully agree with that, but what sorts of difficulties arise at the operational level due to inadequate consultations at the strategic level, and what might be the means of redressing this problem?

My final question concerns interoperability. The troops led by the Force Commanders are from different countries and represent varied cultures, thus ensuring that interoperability among them must be a massive challenge. An effort is ongoing in the Secretariat to generate standardized training models and a global training network, which we support. But what are the problems that the Commanders currently face, and how can we help them overcome them? I know these questions require long and detailed answers, which may keep us here longer, but I wanted to highlight them as areas where we could greatly benefit from the first-hand input of our Force Commanders.

In conclusion, I would like once again to thank the Force Commanders who are present here and ask them to convey our sincere gratitude to the servicemen and women in blue helmets who are putting their lives in danger every day and night in order to maintain peace and security.

The President (*spoke in Russian*): I shall now make a statement in my capacity as representative of the Russian Federation.

We thank the Force Commanders for their substantive briefings. We have listened with great interest to their ideas and assessments. The Russian Federation views peacekeeping as one of the most important functions of the United Nations and actively participates in it. Russian peacekeepers are taking part in operations in the Middle East, in various regions of Africa and in Haiti. We provide considerable logistical and transport support for peacekeeping operations.

The peacekeeping activities of the United Nations are in a process of constant evolution, conceptually and operationally, as they respond to new political realities. Given the growing list of complex peacekeeping operations, in recent years the United Nations has seen growing demand for its resources and as a result is facing unprecedented challenges that it has to address. The growing diversity and complexity of those tasks requires enhanced military expertise for the steps that must be taken within the framework of United Nations peacekeeping.

Russia's proposal to further revitalize the activities of the Military Staff Committee is still on the table. The Committee is drafting recommendations on operational aspects of peacekeeping activities; its participation in measures to determine the readiness of contingents and infrastructure for peace operations would allow it to supply the Council with reliable, timely information, as well as to enhance the quality of military expertise available to United Nations peacekeeping as a whole.

Particular attention should be given to ensuring the appropriate preparation of peacekeeping contingents on the basis of common standards and coordinated national programmes, and to providing comprehensive support for their activities. The task of enhancing United Nations peacekeeping also calls for tapping more effectively into resources of regional organizations, in accordance with Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations.

Obviously, operational mandates should be clear, feasible and adequate to the situation. The shortfall of financial, material and technical resources dictates the need for making the best use of existing capacities. Given the growing demand for police contingents, we need to seek a rational division of labour between them and military peacekeeping contingents. It is important to demarcate peacekeeping and post-conflict peacebuilding functions in peacekeeping mandates. United Nations peacekeepers should be given only initial tasks in the area of peacebuilding; the process of social and economic reform should more actively involve specialized structures of the United Nations system and regional organizations. Effective coordination among all components of complex peacekeeping operations — military, police and civilian — should be conducted under the leadership of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, while fully maintaining his policy oversight of activities of such operations, in strict compliance with Security Council mandates.

When sending peacekeepers into areas of conflict, the international community should pay particular attention to ensuring their security. Recently, there has been a regrettable increase in the number of attacks on peacekeepers, which is totally unacceptable. Our hope is that today's meeting will reaffirm our shared interest in further improving the effectiveness of United Nations peacekeeping operations carried out in accordance with the Charter and with standards of international law, while necessarily maintaining the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security. That is our policy guarantee that operations will be carried out successfully. We believe that today's meeting has been extremely useful, and we suggest that such exchanges of view with Force Commanders of United Nations peacekeeping operations be held on a regular basis.

I now resume my functions as President of the Security Council.

I give the floor to the representative of Canada.

Mr. Normandin (Canada): I would like to thank you, Mr. President, for this opportunity to discuss the challenges facing contemporary peacekeeping operations. The presence of the Force Commanders of our peacekeeping missions here in New York this week is very welcome. They certainly merit our recognition and our sincere gratitude for the exceptional work they do, often in the most trying conditions and circumstances. Their opening commentaries this morning have afforded members a unique occasion to gain a deeper insight into the more practical aspects of their missions.

As we know, peacekeeping forces continue to be put to the test in operational environments that are characterized by multidimensional challenges and asymmetric threats. Military, police and civilian experts face continuous threats from belligerents who either ignore or seek to undermine the progress of peace processes. Casualties, unfortunately, are becoming more common. United Nations personnel have been taken hostage or victimized by unchecked criminality. There is thus a growing need for the use of force to protect United Nations personnel or others from immediate danger. To cope with threats and practical difficulties on the ground, it is our duty as Member States to ensure that field commanders have the tools for success.

We call upon peacekeeping forces to execute a wide range of tasks. This requires mandates and forces designed for flexibility, responsiveness and mobility. Equally, inherent adaptability to changing conditions on the ground has become a necessary characteristic of forces deployed on missions. The success of field commanders in achieving mandated tasks is shaped in part by their awareness of the situation on the ground and their ability to mobilize adequate forces

appropriately to deter, disrupt or, if necessary, defend against attacks.

Enhanced situational awareness is a key enabler for the command function. In support of this, modern technologies must be fully exploited to provide force commanders with timely and accurate information allowing them to gauge both the nature and the criticality of threats to security. At the same time, improving the ability to collate and analyse data, building on the concepts of the joint mission analysis centres and joint operations centres, is essential to improving decision-making. In addition, the development of staff capacities through training and mentoring is vital to providing missions with the ability to distil information and translate it into effective action.

(*spoke in French*)

In responding to threats, force mobility, often over extremes of terrain and distance, is now a defining feature of peacekeeping capabilities. In this regard, commanders appear to be hampered by two difficulties. The first is the capacity gap, in particular in terms of helicopters and ground transport. It is therefore essential that the Secretariat work with existing and potential contributors to address any systemic impediments that limit the capacity of Member States to support missions in this way.

The second difficulty is that contingents are deployed without the contingent-owned equipment and materials needed to meet expected tasks. Here, effective cooperation among the Council, the Secretariat, troop- and police-contributing countries and donors can serve to quickly identify such shortfalls at the mission-preparation stage and thus allow solutions to be found.

As important as properly equipped forces are troops that are properly trained to carry out the tasks assigned them. Deployed personnel need to be given appropriate guidance that enables them to fulfil their complex and specialized responsibilities. From an institutional point of view, we must continue to build a doctrinal framework on the basis of which effective pre-deployment training can be designed. In practical terms, we need to make use of existing organizations that focus on training cooperation — such as the International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centres, the Latin American Association of Peace Operations Training Centres and the African Peace Support Trainers' Association — to ensure coherence in pre-deployment training programmes.

In conclusion, we have seen some significant progress in terms of capabilities in planning, managing and executing peacekeeping operations. It is therefore vitally important that we keep up this momentum in order to ensure that these missions can carry out their work in a way that keeps pace with the changing realities on the ground. It is by adapting resources, equipment and training to these changing conditions that we will be able to provide commanders on the ground with the optimal conditions for success. We would, of course, appreciate comments from the Commanders on the issues that I have addressed in my statement, in particular practical on-the-ground issues relating to mobility, information management, doctrine and training.

The President (*spoke in Russian*): I now give the floor to the representative of India.

Mr. Manjeev Singh Puri (India): I should like to thank you, Sir, for having organized this very important discussion. I am very glad to see the Under-Secretary-General and the Force Commanders here in our midst.

As one of the most active participants in United Nations peacekeeping operations, India attaches very great significance to United Nations peacekeeping and its role in the maintenance of international peace and security.

The context of United Nations peacekeeping is changing, and this changing scenario demands changes in our response. It is therefore good that we are having across-the-board discussions on United Nations peacekeeping in different forums. Our delegation has engaged constructively and made meaningful contributions to the evolution of the policy discourse on United Nations peacekeeping.

India's experience in United Nations peacekeeping is unparalleled and our credentials can be matched by few others. We have been present in virtually every United Nations peacekeeping operation. Today, we are present in significant numbers in the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), the United Nations Mission in the Sudan, the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti

(MINUSTAH), the United Nations Mission in Liberia, the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force and the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste. Recently, in response to a request from the United Nations, we have tripled our police contribution to MINUSTAH.

Indeed, as I speak here, more than 8,000 Indian soldiers and police personnel are deployed in United Nations peacekeeping. It is they who are converting the Council's words into action, and they do so in exceedingly challenging circumstances and situations.

I am happy that in the long tradition of supporting United Nations peacekeeping by providing senior leadership, we have just seconded Lieutenant General Chander Prakash Wadhwa of the Indian Army to be the Force Commander of MONUSCO. I am happy that he is here in the Council today.

The role of women in peacekeeping has been a key focus for the Security Council. We have endeavoured to meet the Council's aspirations in this regard, too. I have the honour to draw the attention of the Council here to the Indian female formed police unit in Liberia, which has not only brought credit to United Nations peacekeeping but has also added possible new and very much required dimensions to the scope of the efforts of United Nations peacekeeping. We are also working on the possibility of increasing the number of such female peacekeepers.

The nature of the Security Council's mandates and the manner in which they are generated is an area that needs to be looked at carefully. In today's context, mandates have been found to be too broad and detached from realities on the ground. It is important that mandates be clear, achievable and in keeping with the available capabilities and resources. This is particularly true for uniformed personnel, who, by virtue of their organizational culture, are used to clear instructions and objectives. Unrealistic mandates also lead to situations in which missions start asking contingents to undertake tasks and utilize contingent-owned equipment in a manner that is inconsistent with the framework of their deployment agreed between the contributing countries and the United Nations. This, of course, demands the substantive engagement of the countries that contribute manpower and resources to the peacekeeping operations, and we can only reiterate the absolutely critical imperative that such consultations be substantive, meaningful and result in views of troop contributors providing the bedrock of the mandate decision. There have been improvements in this regard, but much more needs to be done. For example, we have yet to be briefed in detail about recent developments in the UNIFIL operational area despite our troops being there. We have also had occasions in recent times, in terms of specific events in a United Nations operation in West Africa where we have peacekeepers, when we have been concerned by command and control issues on the ground and have had concerns in terms of keeping us in the loop in New York.

Peacekeeping, for a long time, was essentially about Blue Helmets and establishing a measure of security. In the type of crises that we face today we need a much broader array of responses than the pure security one. Today's peacekeepers have come to play a critical role in humanitarian emergencies and are often thrust into the midst of civil wars. Frequently they are called upon to protect civilian populations when they have been uprooted from their homes. Law and order challenges have added the civilian dimension to peacekeeping operations. Disarming combatants and reforming the security sector have also become essential to a peacekeeping strategy.

In such circumstances we need to be particularly concerned about ensuring a high degree of operational support. Lack of equipment and spares and inadequate living conditions are critical areas that rarely receive attention. Forces are not given sufficient time to prepare for operations on the ground. Hence, I think it is very important that there be a clear recognition that better peacekeeping requires more resources, human and material, including command.

In closing, I salute peacekeepers from my country and fellow nations who have laid down their lives for United Nations missions. India reiterates its commitment to working with the United Nations in the maintenance of international peace and security.

The President (*spoke in Russian*): I now give the floor to the representative of Pakistan.

Mr. Haroon (Pakistan): Thank you, Mr. President, for convening today's meeting, although normally at this time of year we look forward to a more in-depth exchange. And, while welcoming all the bemedalled gentlemen and officers sitting in this Chamber, I would like to have seen a more interactive format. But perhaps that can be done at some other time. The

initiative to get views of the force commanders on peacekeeping themes is commendable. I will briefly touch on the concepts discussed in today's meeting.

At the outset, I would like to mention that I endorse a lot of what my colleague from India closed his speech with.

As a leading troop contributor with vital stakes in United Nations peacekeeping operations, Pakistan has been supportive of peacekeeping missions with complex and challenging mandates. That is evident from our record in the Security Council. Council resolutions 1509 (2003) and 1565 (2004), which authorized strengthened missions in Liberia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo respectively, were supported by Pakistan during its term in the Council in 2003 and 2004. Pakistani troops have also participated in those very challenging Missions.

But I feel that not enough has been said or attention paid in the Council. We should have taken the Council as the absolutely correct forum to discuss the concept of robust peacekeeping. I have heard the discussion by force commanders on this issue, and I would beg to disagree with some of what has been said. I believe that it is here in this Chamber that we must make the decisions. While we must listen to them, we must also encourage them to act more boldly and to seek to meet the wishes of the Council in a more decisive manner.

The complex mandates often ascribed as robust peacekeeping are conceived, drafted and adopted here. It becomes the responsibility of the Council to ensure that existing peacekeeping architecture provides for sufficient troop strength, trained and well-equipped personnel, force enablers and multipliers, rapid deployment, tactical and strategic reserve capacities and logistic backups to sustain the challenges of what we call robust peacekeeping. Needless to say, sufficient finances should also be kept in mind as an enabler. Equally important is applying robust peacekeeping with reference to a particular conflict zone and not treating the concept with the broad brush of political generalizations. Robustness of the required extent is present in all the missions. Beyond this, generalizing the concept of robust peacekeeping can risk overloading the United Nations peacekeeping architecture.

It is evident that success in complex missions with robust mandates requires a comprehensive approach that ranges from conflict prevention to conflict management to preventing relapse. Protection of civilians and support to humanitarian assistance are the cardinal objectives, which cannot be accomplished without ownership by the host entity. Engagement of the host Government and local political actors, however instable and rudimentary they may be, is therefore essential. Emphasis on security sector reform, together with disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and peacebuilding strategies, will only cushion the physical challenge inherent in the protection of civilians and support to humanitarian assistance. In the context of a comprehensive approach, engagement of strong regional actors can only be described as propitious. The African Union's participation in the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur and the African Union Mission in Somalia is invaluable in both political and military terms. We welcome replicating that template in other missions.

United Nations peacekeeping has graduated from its traditional form to multifaceted missions with complex mandates. This evolution is part of the discourse on peacekeeping reform. Just like the peacekeeping missions, such discourse must remain depoliticized. We hope that today's meeting will steer our collective deliberations on the challenges of modern day peacekeeping towards professional and pragmatic realms.

The President (*spoke in Russian*): I now give the floor to the representative of the Philippines.

Mr. Cabactulan (Philippines): On behalf of the Philippine delegation, I warmly congratulate you, Sir, on your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council for the month of August. Let me assure you of my delegation's full support and cooperation during your term as President of this body. I also wish to express my appreciation to the Security Council for this opportunity to address it on this important issue. The Philippine delegation also conveys its appreciation for the briefing by the Under-Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations, Mr. Alain Le Roy, and commends the men and women in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations both here at United Nations Headquarters and in the various field missions overseas.

I also wish to acknowledge the contributions made by the force commanders: Lieutenant General

Sikander Afzal of Pakistan for the United Nations Mission in Liberia; Major General Luiz Guilherme Paul Cruz of Brazil for the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti; Lieutenant General Babacar Gaye for the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo; Major General Moses Bisang Obi of Nigeria for the United Nations Mission in the Sudan; Major General Robert Mood of Norway for the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization; and our very own Major General Natalio Ecarma III for the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force. Their initiatives and efforts have certainly made a difference in their respective missions and operations.

At the risk of sounding nostalgic, if not mellow, in the face of the very serious issue before us, allow me to recall that it has been 47 years since the Philippines first engaged in and contributed to the maintenance of international peace with the deployment of a 40-member air force squadron to the Congo. Since that time, the Philippines has endeavoured to fulfil its international commitment to contribute to the preservation of peace and security in the world. Despite our limited resources, the Philippines strives to find ways to help shoulder the peacekeeping burden by addressing the need of the United Nations for troops and police officers for existing and emerging missions.

I am pleased to share with Council members and all other delegations present that, at present, there are about 1,057 Filipino military and police personnel serving with peacekeepers from other Member States in nine mission areas around the world. Just last year, the Philippines expanded its participation in United Nations peacekeeping operations with the deployment of a 336-man infantry battalion to the Golan Heights. The Philippines has also been given the honour of leading United Nations operations in the Golan, with, as I have already mentioned, the appointment by the Secretary-General of Major General Ecarma as Head of Mission and Force Commander.

I also wish to inform the Council that the Philippines is now in the process of strengthening its own peacekeeping mechanisms to allow it to respond more effectively to United Nations requests for troop contributions. We are now working on a new road map that takes into account recent developments in the field of peacekeeping and which, we hope, will lead to the expansion of our participation in United Nations operations in the near future, wherever they may be.

The Philippines has been closely monitoring developments in how we help keep the peace in conflict areas abroad. We remain satisfied with the achievements made by the United Nations thus far and would like to take this opportunity to pay tribute to the courageous and dedicated men and women serving under the blue and white flag of our United Nations. The Philippines is especially aware of the sacrifices that our peacekeepers make — especially those who are deployed in harsh and hostile areas — and salutes all those who have given their lives in the cause of peace.

For the past several years, we have seen how the United Nations has struggled to meet the increase in the demand for peacekeepers worldwide. As an active troop-contributing country, the Philippines is aware of the deep operational demands of peacekeeping and how these demands continue to grow and evolve. Certainly, the extension and, in some cases, the expansion of mandates are among the manifestations that we can see. We continue to note that often this surge or increase in the demand has not always been matched with the capabilities and resources required to meet our peacekeeping commitments. However, the Philippines acknowledges the continued efforts made by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the Department of Field Support (DFS) to fully address these increased demands, despite other challenges and difficulties.

With regard to the protection of civilians in conflict areas, especially women and children, it is well known that the Philippines supports the three-tiered framework proposed by DPKO and DFS in conceptualizing the role of United Nations peacekeeping operations in protecting civilians. To reiterate, these are providing protection through the political process, providing protection from physical violence and establishing a protective environment. The Philippines agrees that the elements of this framework must be implemented simultaneously in order to achieve concrete results in the most efficient, expeditious and proper manner.

With regard to peacebuilding, our position is also well known. The Philippines believes that United Nations peacekeepers should not be considered long-term peace builders, as peacebuilding is a national challenge that entails national ownership and responsibility. We have said before that only national actors can address in a sustainable manner the needs and goals of their respective societies. Hence, national

ownership of the process is the ultimate goal and must be emphasized to both our peacekeepers and the national actors and stakeholders. The handover of tasks and responsibilities from peacekeepers to national partners in the post-conflict period must be given priority in the early stages of the peacebuilding process. However, the Philippines acknowledges that in an immediate post-conflict scenario, United Nations peacekeepers are more often than not tasked to carry out initial peacebuilding responsibilities such as providing basic security, delivering peace dividends, shoring up and building confidence in the political process and strengthening core national capacity — all intended to lay the foundation for sustainable development.

In closing, allow me to reiterate our full cooperation with the Security Council as well as our continuing commitment to help keep the peace and security and to prevent the escalation of conflict in various regions across the globe.

The President (*spoke in Russian*): I now give the floor to the representative of the Republic of Korea.

Mr. Park In-Kook (Republic of Korea): I thank you, Mr. President, for organizing this meeting today and for giving my delegation the opportunity to participate in the debate. I would like to express my appreciation to Under-Secretary-General Alain Le Roy and the force commanders here with us today for their comprehensive and informative briefings.

For the last six decades, United Nations peacekeeping operations have evolved to successfully address diverse challenges arising from various conflicts in a rapidly changing political landscape. The overall number of United Nations peacekeeping personnel in the field has increased nine-fold over the last eleven years. Last year, the Fifth Committee approved a record high budget of $7.7 billion for 2009-2010 for peacekeeping missions. United Nations peacekeeping has already reached a level that transcends what the Brahimi report (S/2000/809) had envisaged 10 years ago.

My delegation notes the report of the Secretary-General dated 22 December 2009 (A/64/573) and supports the four interlinked building blocks to focus on.

At the outset, I would like to recall the words that Under-Secretary-General Alain Le Roy delivered to the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations this past February when he said that

> "To develop the required capabilities to implement all mandated tasks, including through training of personnel, we need further clarity and practical guidance regarding the roles and expectations on peacekeeping operations."

Moving forward, we should consider those words carefully.

In this regard, partnerships with regional organizations, civilian partners and the private sector need to be further developed. Regional and subregional organizations, such as the African Union and the European Union, have become crucial partners of the United Nations, especially in sharing the burden of peacekeeping operations. A concrete and comprehensive model or modality of cooperation with such organizations should be developed.

In order to ensure that operations are effective and efficient, a global and responsive rapid deployment system is key. The support system should also correspond to the nature of the peacekeeping operation. In this regard, I am glad to announce that the Government of the Republic of Korea has recently adopted domestic legislation that enables the deployment of standby forces on short notice. I hope our efforts will help to further enhance the readiness and responsiveness of the United Nations.

On the support side, the creation of the Department of Field Support (DFS) is one of the major successes of the reform driven by Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and was instrumental in providing integrated field support. We anticipate that the strategic support plan that DFS is deploying will take United Nations field support capability to another level.

But deploying quickly must not be the only planning factor during the early stages of a mission. United Nations peacekeeping operations have become increasingly multidimensional, involving situations that are aptly termed complex emergencies and varying greatly in scope and mandate. Hence, peacekeeping should be pursued on a two-track parallel approach, alongside peacebuilding efforts. In fact, peacebuilding efforts have now become an important feature of many peacekeeping missions. That relationship underscores the need for clear planning among the various

stakeholders, with a view towards exit and transition strategies.

To ensure sustainability and ultimate success, peacekeeping must extend beyond meeting more immediate needs, such as overseeing ceasefires, to laying the foundations necessary to maintain lasting peace. Only when such basic structures for sustainable peace are put in place can a peacekeeping operation disengage successfully, resulting in a smooth transition and a timely exit. To achieve that, peacekeeping operations today must not involve just the military dimension. They must also encompass intertwined strategies rooted in development, human rights, and disarmament — in particular with regard to disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes.

Similarly, preventive actions or alternatives to heavy peacekeeping operations need to be actively pursued. Although a peacekeeping operation might be less costly than other military options, mediation, civilian and military observers, police observation and preventive deployments are more cost-effective. In that regard, we welcome the setting up of the Mediation Support Unit in the Department of Political Affairs. Mediation and other preventive measures should not be considered separately from a peacekeeping operation. They should be seen as a complementary and integral part of everyday peacekeeping operations.

Close coordination with various actors such as the World Bank, the United Nations Development Programme, UNICEF and others involved in peacekeeping missions will be crucial in creating the conditions that allow for gradual phase-out and exit, with a view towards lasting peace. Those actors can remain on the ground after the drawdown or withdrawal of peacekeeping forces and continue to provide the necessary assistance to ensure mission success.

More than six months ago, DPKO and the United Nations suffered tragic loss of lives and injury after the earthquake struck in Haiti. The Republic of Korea remains steadfast in our efforts to help reconstruct Haiti following the earthquake. Beyond humanitarian contributions, Korea has also dispatched a 240-strong engineering company to the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti. The company is currently active in the area of responsibility in Leogane, one of the hardest hit areas of the country. Our troops have focused on providing targeted relief in the areas of electricity restoration, public health infrastructure expansion and water supply reinstatement in the country.

The Republic of Korea is also encouraged by the strengthening of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) after the war in the summer of 2006. We take note of the mention in the report of the Secretary General issued on 1 July (S/2010/352) that the Governments of Lebanon and Israel are showing their commitment to the implementation of resolution 1701 (2006). However, as the recent violence has shown, we are concerned that stability in the region continues to be threatened. UNIFIL must therefore remain vigilant and promote communication and coordination with both Lebanon and Israel to ensure that the border remains calm.

Finally, my delegation welcomes the remarkable increase in the number of women serving in the field, in particular in leadership positions. In the past few years, there has been a drastic increase in the number of women serving in senior civilian positions in field missions. Furthermore, women now make up 30 per cent of those deployed as civilians in peacekeeping operations. My delegation hopes that such progress will continue.

The President (*spoke in Russian*): I now give the floor to the representative of Bangladesh.

Mr. Momem (Bangladesh): I thank you, Mr. President, and the other members of the Security Council for organizing this meeting. I also especially thank Under-Secretary-General Alain Le Roy and the force commanders who are participating in this meeting.

As we have mentioned elsewhere, United Nations peacekeeping operations are a unique flagship activity of the Organization that entail risking human lives for the cause of international peace and security. I take my hat off to those who have made the supreme sacrifice to maintain peace and stability in the world.

The success of peacekeeping in recent years has led to high expectations and to a surge in demand. An assessment of future conflict trends suggests that the need for peacekeeping will increase, not decrease, and that the nature of peacekeeping will be multidimensional and more complex, not simple. Historical experience in conflict zones and current

political dynamics substantiate the notion that upcoming demand will fall on the shoulders of United Nations peacekeeping. The onus is therefore on us to lead the process through effective cooperation, with clearly stipulated mandates backed by sufficient resources and specific policy and implementation guidelines. This warrants effectively forging an inclusive partnership among the Security Council, the Secretariat and troop- and police-contributing countries, as well as ensuring the capability of peacekeepers to achieve their mandated objectives.

The success of a peacekeeping mission largely depends on the political support it receives and on the adequate and timely provision of financial, logistical and human resources. In that regard, we reiterate the importance of closer and more active involvement with troop- and police-contributing countries when deciding on new peacekeeping missions or extending or amending the mandates of current missions. In that regard, we would like to emphasize the following specific measures. There must be broader political partnership between the United Nations and host Governments. There must be effective consultation among the Security Council, the Secretariat and troop- and police-contributing countries. The views of troop-contributing countries must be reflected in deciding mission start-ups and making any changes in the mandate of existing missions. Initial mandates must be crafted carefully while giving a full picture to potential TCCs. Specific timelines must be stipulated, in consultation with TCCs, in the course of finalizing memorandums of understanding. Any change in operations must accord with the views of those working in the field. And we must ensure fair representation for TCCs in the Secretariat's decision-making process and in the process of implementation.

At the operational level, a partnership must be forged with all relevant stakeholders. In our view, the following specific actions are imperative in that regard. There must be sufficient political partnership between the United Nations and host authorities. There must be necessary coordination with the host Government or authority to allow peacekeepers to operate. General and specific coordination needs to be ensured among all parties, including regional organizations. And concerted efforts need to be made by United Nations agencies, funds and programmes and the Bretton Woods institutions working in the field.

We also believe that the following elements must be reflected in the process of start-up, operation and expansion for successful peacekeeping operations: First, mandates must be clear, specific and well defined. Secondly, mandates must be supported by sufficient resources, both financial and human. Thirdly, necessary political support must be ensured. Fourthly, sufficient measures must be taken to ensure the safety and security of the peacekeepers. Fifthly, the United Nations must take the necessary measures to ensure sufficient training in all areas of activities included in the mandate.

I would like to reiterate Bangladesh's principled position that gender sensitivity and the involvement of women in peacekeeping operations, in line with resolution 1325 (2000) and the subsequent follow-up resolutions, should be adhered to. We are pleased that the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Field Support are working together in this context and have recently launched gender guidelines in United Nations military peacekeeping.

Bangladesh, for its part, has played a cardinal role in the maintenance of international peace and security. Since 1988, Bangladesh has been involved in 36 United Nations peacekeeping operations, with approximately 90,000 personnel. Today, Bangladesh is ranked first in the field. We take pride in our modest contribution to the maintenance of international peace and security. Through the years, nearly 100 of our valiant peacekeepers have laid down their lives for the cause of United Nations-sponsored peacekeeping missions. We reiterate our commitment to continuing to work with the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security.

The President (*spoke in Russian*): We have now reached the second round of our discussion.

I shall now give the floor to Mr. Le Roy, pursuant to rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, to respond to comments and questions raised.

Mr. Le Roy: At the outset, I would like very much to thank you one more time, Sir, for organizing this debate and for the great support we have heard this morning for our peacekeeping missions, and especially our Force Commanders, from Security Council members and of course from those who spoke under rule 37, representing countries that participate in peacekeeping operations.

At the outset, because not all of our Force Commanders will have the opportunity to speak, allow me, Sir, to just introduce those who have not been able to speak this morning. I will start with Colonel Svystak, Chief Military Officer of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo; Colonel Logan, Chief Military Officer of the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste; Major General Kandji, Force Commander of the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad; Major General Hafiz, Force Commander of the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI); Lieutenant General Prakash, incoming Force Commander for the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo; Major General Ecarma, head of Mission and Force Commander of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force; Rear Admiral Sánchez, Force Commander of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus; Major General Zhao, Force Commander of United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara; and Major General Kim, Chief Military Officer of the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan. I think the others have spoken and were introduced this morning.

For the rest of the debate, as many questions have been asked and some have been targeted to specific Force Commanders, I would propose an order for the sequence of events, to make it interactive. I would suggest that Lieutenant General Afzal of the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) should answer the questions directed to him about transition and the time to draw down in Liberia, the slow progress in security sector reform, the early peacebuilding activities of UNMIL, the challenges for the elections and the risk of a security vacuum. Those questions were specifically directed towards General Afzal.

Then I propose that Lieutenant General Gaye answer the questions on, of course, the protection of civilians; the conditionality policy, technology, intelligence needs for our missions, mobility, and cooperation with other missions, especially concerning the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA).

Then I propose that Major General Cruz of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti answer the questions directed to him on sexual and gender-based violence in internally displaced persons camps, deterrence, the role of the engineers, and the efforts and coordination undertaken with development actors.

Then I would propose that Major General Hafiz of UNOCI answer the questions on the protection of civilians, transition, interoperability — which have been raised on several occasions — and formation of the troops.

Then I propose that General Kandji answer the question on deterrence and interoperability, especially, of course, for a mission that has transitioned from a European Union operation to a United Nations operations.

Then I propose that Major General Obi of the United Nations Mission in the Sudan answer the question on cooperation with other regional missions, especially on the question of the LRA; the question on capacities; and of course the key question on helicopters.

Then I would propose that Major General Mood answer the question raised by the representative of Lebanon about the reporting of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization.

I would give the last word — if you agree, Sir — to General Obiakor to conclude, for our part.

The President (*spoke in Russian*): The coordinating role of the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping can only have a very strong impression on Council members. The presidency of the Security Council fully agrees with the procedure he has proposed, and I believe that other members are in agreement as well.

I shall now give the floor to Lieutenant General Afzal, pursuant to rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, to respond to comments and questions raised.

Lieutenant General Afzal: I appreciate the concern shown by the members of the Council in respect of Liberia and will endeavour to answer the questions that they have raised.

I would like to thank all participants for their questions, especially the question dealing with the transition from the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) to the security forces of Liberia and the concern they have shown for the successful completion of the Mission.

First, to start in a sequential manner, the drawdown, as envisaged to date by the Security Council, has been completed, and the present strength of the UNMIL military and police components, including the enablers, is more than sufficient to meet the requirements that the Security Council has mandated for the conduct of the forthcoming elections by the end of next year.

Secondly, the transition phase, which is the handing over of security responsibilities from UNMIL to the Government of Liberia's security agencies, is already in progress. On the instructions of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, UNMIL commenced with a workshop, which was held in June this year, between not only UNMIL and the Government of Liberia's different departments and ministries, but also experts from other missions that had transitioned to this phase. As a consequence, we identified a list of those actions or functions that UNMIL undertakes at present to provide security and those persons who, from the side of the Government of Liberia, would be taking over that responsibility in the future. We also identified the existing capacity of that particular agency of the Government of Liberia to undertake the task and the assistance and guidance that would be required to develop that capacity and capability.

Moving on to the forthcoming elections, UNMIL is mandated to provide logistical support and, as I mentioned earlier, we can do it with the existing resources. However, there is definitely going to be an area of concern, and that would be the capacity of the security forces of Liberia themselves, especially the police and the military, to ensure security during this period.

As the Council is well aware, the existing United Nations police strength in Liberia is 4,000 personnel, whereas the strength of the Liberian National Police stands at 3,000. The existing United Nations military strength in Liberia is 8,000, and the existing military strength of the armed forces of Liberia stands at 2,000.

The Council is well aware of where the gap already lies, and what is essential is to raise more officers for the Liberian National Police, which should be able to fulfil the security requirements during the forthcoming elections and afterwards. This would not only mean raising additional police, but also establishing police stations, providing them with vehicles, wherewithal, communications and, last but not least, the sustenance required for the police personnel to be operable in the long run. This also relates to Liberia's limited budget. With a limited budget, they can only provide so much space for the security sector within the existing budget. As has been noted, the existing budget for this year has been increased nominally for the Government security sector.

Last but not least, I would like to conclude by saying that without providing security, there can be no governance and no security.

The President (*spoke in Russian*): I thank Lieutenant General Afzal for the clarifications provided. I give the floor to Lieutenant General Gaye.

Lieutenant General Gaye (*spoke in French*): The impact of the conditional support policy on the security and protection of civilians is positive, first in terms of the Congolese military authorities' awareness of protection issues. Secondly, that policy has obliged us in the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), now the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), to develop procedures — primarily to monitor activities of the Forces armées de la République démocratique du Congo (FARDC) within the dictates of conditional support policy. But it is clear that by reducing our support to the FARDC, as required by the conditional support policy, we have thus created conditions where more FARDC forces may live off of the population. There has been a growing awareness of human rights issues and respect for international humanitarian law, but a reduction in the number of battalions supported and thus an increased risk that FARDC forces will seek to live off the population.

(*spoke in English*)

Concerning technology assets for providing additional intelligence to the force commanders, I think that all of the force commanders will welcome this important step. The issue will be to examine its cost-effectiveness and political implications, notably as concerns the relations between the force and the host country, and, last but not least, to look at this from a military perspective. Will we focus on tactical intelligence, operational intelligence or strategic intelligence? But there is definitely a need, particularly when operating under Chapter VII, to provide the force with intelligence assets. That will definitely help improve the protection of the population.

Concerning cooperation among neighbouring missions, that has already been done. There is a framework for meetings among MONUC, the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT), the United Nations Mission in the Sudan, the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur and the United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office in the Central African Republic (BONUCA). Several meetings have already been held in Entebbe and in the various missions. Unfortunately, because of visa issues, we did not succeed in holding a meeting in the Sudan or one in MINURCAT. But definitely, at the Force Commander level and also at the level of Head of Mission, there is a framework for regional coordination.

At the tactical level, MONUSCO's intent is to set up a joint operations centre in Dungu among the FARDC — that is the Congolese military — MONUSCO and the Uganda People's Defence Forces (UPDF), because UPDF is currently operating in the four countries I have just named — Uganda, Southern Sudan, Central African Republic and the Democratic Republic of the Congo — so their participation will be part of the coordination.

The President (*spoke in Russian*): I thank Lieutenant General Gaye for the clarifications provided. I give the floor to Major General Paul Cruz to respond to questions.

Major General Paul Cruz: I thank the Council for giving me the opportunity to clarify some issues. I will begin with engineer participation, which has been reinforced in our mission. We were not only reinforced, but well reinforced by the Japanese and Korean companies of engineers. They are doing remarkable work on main roads that had major damage; they are now repaired. There was a big effort made to remove debris, so we are opening sites, mainly Government facilities, hospitals, schools and orphanages. This process is ongoing. We have had very good reinforcement on those issues.

On the issue of sexual and gender-based violence, one month after the earthquake, when the main camps for internally displaced persons (IDPs) were being established — in the area of Port-au-Prince there are now about 900 IDP camps — we began to notice an increase in violence against women, and we changed our approach to address this problem. This problem must be addressed from a broader perspective that includes community violence reduction personnel and humanitarian people, as well as the presence of the military, the police and the local police. We encourage various actors in this joint strategy, which exists mainly in the larger camps — such as the Jean-Marie Vincent camp — where we had many problems that were reduced by major operations involving the United Nations police, formed police units, the military and the Haitian National Police. This was carried out not only through a security approach, but also with a view to improving living conditions and to spreading the message that persons most at risk, such as women and children, must be protected. This is an ongoing process by which we hope to reduce the number of threats against women in the camps, because their lives there are already difficult.

Our deterrence posture is part of what we are doing, mainly in the poorest areas of Port-au-Prince and other cities. My guidance to the military is: "Be there on foot. Stay there as part of the local community. Be part of the community. Be accepted by them, work with them and thus maintain their confidence in our job and our work." And this has resulted in a very good approach towards the local Haitian people and the local leadership, and it has made our lives much easier than before.

With respect to humanitarian efforts, in the emergency phase we had the challenge of quickly distributing large quantities of food, water and shelter, which was done by a joint operations task centre, where all requests were posted and tasks assigned to the proper sector for appropriate action development, not just towards the military or the police, but also towards all the humanitarian organizations and United Nations agencies that were on board.

But after the emergency phase, under the direction of Special Representative of the Secretary-General Edmond Mulet, the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Humanitarian Coordinator established a strategy to bring coherence to the delivery of humanitarian assistance. This delivery needed to be coherent with the Haitian Government's plan and with that of the Interim Haiti Recovery Commission. We studied their documents and, under the direction of the Deputy Special Representative, we prepared a plan for a more coherent delivery of assistance in the recovery phase in order to prepare for the next phase.

Today, our major logistical challenge is debris. We are working on opening the roads and streets of Port-au-Prince. Of course, delays are expected. Progress can be achieved only in a safe and stable environment. Notwithstanding all the things that have happened in Haiti, with the electoral process that is currently being launched, we are optimistic that the country will recover, that it will soon enter a new phase of greater stability and that it will be better in general.

The President (*spoke in Russian*): I shall now give the floor to Major General Hafiz, pursuant to rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, to respond to comments and questions raised.

Major General Hafiz (*spoke in French*): I am the Force Commander of the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI). It is my honour and privilege to briefly address the issue of the protection of civilians in Côte d'Ivoire. As the Council is aware, under our mission's mandate we have the role and task of protecting civilians who are in imminent danger of violence in areas under our deployment.

Our view is that this task is crucial and significant. We also believe that it is a difficult task to carry out because, to do so, we need resources and means. Our troop strength is 7,000 soldiers in a country that is quite large.

Secondly, in Côte d'Ivoire, threats are sometimes made against civilians by State authorities charged with maintaining order in the country during anti-Government demonstrations. The Council is aware that it is politically difficult to act against authorities charged with maintaining order who threaten civilians.

That having been said, we are fully aware of our mission to protect civilians in imminent danger of violence. To that end, we count on our presence in major cities and in high-risk areas that may be hotspots in times of crisis, protest or violence.

We have deployed troops to play a deterrent role. We undertake regular patrols in the field that allow us to monitor the situation and provide intelligence that is useful for carrying out our protection of civilians tasks. In each sector, we maintain an early warning force that enables us to respond rapidly in case of a deteriorating or exacerbated situation. I would underscore that this task is incumbent on all components of the mission: military, police, civilian affairs, the human rights section and all others.

In this regard, we enjoy full cooperation with the other components of our mission. I would like to add that UNOCI is now in the process of developing and drafting a strategy or plan for discharging our task to protect civilians in imminent danger of violence. I believe that, having developed this plan, we will be in a strong position to protect civilians in imminent danger.

The President (*spoke in Russian*): I shall now give the floor to Major General Kandji, pursuant to rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, to respond to comments and questions raised.

Major General Kandji (*spoke in French*): I have been asked to speak to the Council about the United Nations Mission in Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT), specifically the transition phase from the European Union Force (EUFOR) to MINURCAT, and about our achievements and to briefly touch upon deterrence.

I believe — and the Council would agree — that MINURCAT can be considered a textbook case. The youngest of the missions, it will be the first to expire after a mere 21 months of activity. Over these 21 months, the Mission has gone through all the most critical phases of any deployment. First came the launching of the Mission, followed by the transition from EUFOR to MINURCAT, and now the drawdown announced for 31 December 2010. These three key phases divide the life of the Mission into three sections.

(*spoke in English*)

The first section phase of nine months during which we went at a slow pace because of the difficulties related to the start-up of the Mission. It was only when we had achieved a comfortable operational capability that we entered the second phase, which was five months long. We were almost at the high point of the Mission when we were suddenly asked to stop our operations and start to withdraw.

(*spoke in French*)

The three periods were nine months, five months and seven months, respectively.

(*spoke in English*)

Naturally, those three phases affected our achievement's on the ground. Because of the slowness

of our deployment, during the first nine months we had to accept a great many compromises because we were not there. It is always difficult to reverse a compromise once it is established. Here, we did not respect one of the main aspects of any relief operation, where it is necessary to be strong in relieving a weak unit. But in this case, we had a weak unit to relieve a strong unit. That is where all our difficulties arose.

And our achievements were many. From the military point of view, we were not really in a warfare situation, so the military challenge was not too great. But starting in December, we were at the peak of our deployment — and that peak, again, was 65 per cent of our authorized mandate. We never reached the total authorized strength, and that was how we had to face all those difficulties.

In the other areas of the Mission — civilian and police — the achievements were even greater. I am not here to speak on the substantives, but the Mission has done a lot for prisons, the judiciary, gender issues, and so forth. It has changed mindsets and behaviours in eastern Chad in only 21 months. It is important to mention here that, as part of our activities, we had a military unit that drilled for water in that part of the country, where it is said that they will now have water for 50 years. And we know how important and strategic water can be in that part of the world.

To sum up, I am not ashamed of what we have done. Much has been said, even in this Chamber, accusing the force of having done nothing. So this is a divine opportunity for me to denounce that; it was not true. We have done a lot; the statistics are here. And I think that the seminar that will be conducted in September, as planned by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, will cover all these issues, give clarity and just re-establish the truth for the record.

The last point I was asked to touch on was deterrence. The principle of deterrence is to show force simply in order to be respected, so that the others know that these guys have the capability to operate and to make the difference. What does that mean? You need to have adequate resources. It means presence and force projection all over the theatre. One cannot deter if one cannot move, and in order to move, we come back to the same old story of having helicopters, and so forth.

I think I will just end here, and express the hope that the difficulty we had at the beginning will not come back again. It took too long for us to start the Mission. The mandate to start the Mission was signed two months before 15 March. I think we should agree that we need at least six months for the resources to be developed and force generation to happen, and then we will be in better shape to avoid the difficulties I had to go through during the start-up phase.

The President (*spoke in Russian*): I shall now give the floor to Major General Obi, pursuant to rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, to respond to comments and questions raised.

Major-General Obi: I will touch briefly on the issue of cooperation as it relates to the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), and also on the requirement for helicopters.

As far as the LRA is concerned, it is useful to clarify that cooperation exists between the missions. Here, I would like to say that the missions — the United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS), the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur, the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad — jointly exchange intelligence and have recently designated desk officers for this purpose. We share intelligence on the activities of the LRA. I would also like to say that the various missions have what we call the Force Commanders conference, which is held periodically. During these conferences, issues such as the LRA are also addressed.

I would also like to say here that the issue of the LRA was discussed at the meeting held in June in Entebbe, which took place days after I assumed command. At that meeting, it was generally agreed that right now the LRA operates in small numbers, that it moves across borders, and that it revolves around the leadership and most of the time is surviving by instinct. It also undertakes missions to recharge its ranks by taking on new captives to increase its numbers.

It was also generally felt that the permanent responsibility for addressing the issue of the LRA is that of the host nations around the region, and that they should coordinate their efforts. For our part, we share information and generally address the issue as it relates to civilian protection, because the LRA's activities also affect the protection of civilians. In my own Mission, our planning takes due consideration of activities around the coastal border. We also encourage the

Sudan People's Liberation Army, which has permanent responsibility for addressing the issue, while we address the challenges as they relate to civilian protection.

On the issue of helicopters, I would like to say here that the Sudan as a whole is the largest nation in Africa in terms of land mass, and that Southern Sudan is bigger than most African countries. The UNMIS military force is 10,000 strong. I believe that is related to its mandate, which is mostly about monitoring and giving support to the host nation. Sixty per cent of the force is made up of enablers, while the other 40 per cent includes such components as infantry — the forces you really need for physical operations, patrolling and the like.

Its deployment is over a very wide area. I can give an example of one of my battalions in Juba, which is one of my sectors. The battalion covers an area larger than its own home nation. This means that its team sites are located far apart, perhaps 70 kilometres from each other. One finds oneself travelling long distances by helicopter to go to one team site. Support for this force obviously requires mobility. I should also add here that Southern Sudan presents the very big challenge of a lack of infrastructure capacity. There is an absolute lack of roads. In the rainy season, the place is muddy. Even on foot one can hardly move. One needs special tires to drive in Southern Sudan. Thus, to move in Southern Sudan one needs mostly air mobility. Water transportation is limited to the Nile, and so will not provide enough coverage.

Here I would like to add that UNMIS has been asked by the parties to play a bigger role in supporting the referendums. For this, UNMIS will now be required to give support down to the county level. During the last elections, our support was up to the state level in the state capitals, of which there are 10. But now we are dealing with 79 counties, so preparation for the referendums requires reconnaissance missions and the setting up of infrastructure; after which the Force must be prepared to extend into these areas to provide the security that is required of us, since we must provide security to the United Nations observers and protect civilians.

Now, with a limited force in a large area, and with more counties to cover and more team sites that we must address, we must do more frequent patrolling; we must be in the air most of the time; we must operate with mobile reserves that can react quickly and be delivered where they are needed in the shortest possible time. So our operations will be heavily dependent on mobility, and that generally has to be air mobility because of the terrain and the absence of infrastructure. This makes the issue of helicopters a priority, and they are limited as of now.

The President (*spoke in Russian*): I thank Major General Obi for his comments. I now give the floor to Major General Mood.

Major General Mood: We, the force commanders, have discussed our concerns related to the increasing capability gap, the caveats and the challenges of achieving integrated effects, to mention only a few. We also fully recognize that it is our responsibility to keep the situational awareness of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the Secretary-General and the Security Council up to date through timely and accurate reporting.

To respond the specific question from the representative of Lebanon on the reporting of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), the answer is that UNTSO reports directly to the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations on our dialogue and activities. Our observers in southern Lebanon contribute to the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) reporting in accordance with an operational control relationship, which simply means that, on a day-to-day basis, they report to the UNIFIL Force Commander, in a way that is similar to how those on the Golan interact with the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force. I am confident that these arrangements ensure impartial, factual reporting for the benefit of the awareness of Headquarters related both to the regional perspective and to incidents and violations of Security Council resolutions.

The President (*spoke in Russian*): I thank Major General Mood for his assessments.

I shall now give the floor to Lieutenant General Chikadibia Isaac Obiakor, Military Adviser, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, pursuant to rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council.

Lieutenant General Obiakor: I should like, on behalf the heads of military components — the force commanders present here today — to express gratitude

for this opportunity to speak to the Council on some of our missions. We are indeed encouraged by this interaction.

Although we function in very difficult political and physical environments, and although there is at times, as the Council has heard from the force commanders, a mismatch between the tasks and the resources available, I heard them state that they are encouraged and ever more dedicated to deliver on their mandates.

I should also like to seize this opportunity to thank the Security Council for having given me the opportunity to serve in the United Nations. I also thank the Council on behalf of my colleagues.

The President (*spoke in Russian*): I thank Lieutenant General Obiakor. And, once again, we should like to express our gratitude to him for his productive efforts in the service of the United Nations.

Before adjourning the meeting, I should like, on behalf of the Security Council, to thank all the force commanders who participated in today's meeting for the frank assessments they provided and the ideas they put forward. There is no doubt that everything we heard today will be extremely useful to the Council in its further practical work in this crucial area of peacekeeping operations.

There are no further speakers on my list. The Security Council has thus concluded the present stage of its consideration of the item on its agenda.

The meeting rose at 2.05 p.m.

United Nations S/PV.6371

Security Council

Sixty-fifth year

Provisional

6371st meeting

Tuesday, 10 August 2010, 10 a.m.
New York

President:	Mr. Churkin	(Russian Federation)
Members:	Austria	Mr. Ebner
	Bosnia and Herzegovina	Mr. Barbalić
	Brazil	Mrs. Dunlop
	China	Mr. Yang Tao
	France	Mr. De Rivière
	Gabon	Mr. Moungara Moussotsi
	Japan	Mr. Sumi
	Lebanon	Mr. Khachab
	Mexico	Mr. Heller
	Nigeria	Mr. Onemola
	Turkey	Mr. Apakan
	Uganda	Mr. Mugoya
	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	Mr. Quarrey
	United States of America	Ms. Anderson

Agenda

The situation in Chad, the Central African Republic and the subregion

Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (S/2010/409)

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

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The meeting was called to order at 10.05 a.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

The situation in Chad, the Central African Republic and the subregion

Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (S/2010/409)

The President (*spoke in Russian*): I should like to inform the Council that I have received a letter from the representative of the Central African Republic, in which he requests that the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Regional Integration and Francophone World of the Central African Republic be invited to participate in the consideration of the item on the Council's agenda. In conformity with the usual practice, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite the Minister to participate in the consideration of the item, without the right to vote, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure.

There being no objection, it is so decided.

I have also received a letter from the representative of Chad, in which he requests to be invited to participate in the consideration of the item on the Council's agenda. In conformity with the usual practice, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite that representative to participate in the consideration of the item, without the right to vote, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure.

There being no objection, it is so decided.

On behalf of the Council, I wish to extend a warn welcome to His Excellency General Antoine Gambi, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Regional Integration and Francophone World of the Central African Republic.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Gambi (Central African Republic) and Mr. Allam-mi (Chad) took seats at the Council table.

The President (*spoke in Russian*): In accordance with the understanding reached in the Council's prior consultations, I shall take it that the Council agrees to extend an invitation under rule 39 of its provisional rules of procedure to Mr. Youssef Mahmoud, Special Representative of the Secretary-General and head of the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad.

It is so decided.

I invite Mr. Mahmoud to take a seat at the Council table.

The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. The Council is meeting in accordance with the understanding reached in its prior consultations.

Members of the Council have before them document S/2010/409, which contains the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad.

At this meeting, the Security Council will hear a briefing by Mr. Youssef Mahmoud. I now give the floor to Mr. Mahmoud.

Mr. Mahmoud: I thank you, Sir, for the opportunity to present to the Security Council the latest report of the Secretary-General (S/2010/409) on the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT). This is the first report since the Council adopted resolution 1923 (2010) on 25 May, authorizing a revised mandate for MINURCAT. The report before the Council contains an assessment of the security and humanitarian situations, of the progress made towards the fulfilment by the Government of Chad of the tasks and benchmarks set out in paragraphs 2 and 3 of resolution 1923 (2010), and of the implementation of the mandate of MINURCAT. The report also contains an assessment of international and regional options for the Central African Republic based on the Secretary-General's evaluation of the consequences of MINURCAT's departure from the north-eastern part of that country.

Following the adoption of resolution 1923 (2010), MINURCAT has worked to adjust its tasks and posture in eastern Chad to the new mandate. Accordingly, on 27 May its military component ceased all area security patrols and escorts, and confined its activities to those outlined in paragraphs 10 and 11 of the resolution. By 15 July, MINURCAT's military component had been reduced to 2,174, with 1,878 in Chad and 296 in north-eastern Central African Republic, and is now based in four main locations —

three in eastern Chad and one in north-eastern Central African Republic.

As far as the security situation is concerned, I should like to summarize it as follows. Some criminal activities and banditry remained the main threat to security in eastern Chad during the one and a half months covered by the report. As in earlier periods, there have been no reports of deliberate targeting of civilians or of fresh significant internal displacements.

As of 27 May, when MINURCAT's military suspended area patrolling and escorts, the Government took over full responsibility for the security and protection of civilians and humanitarian workers in eastern Chad. Despite the complexities of the security situation and logistical and other limitations, the Government has spared no effort to rise to the challenge.

The Détachement intégré de sécurité (DIS) has increased its escorts of humanitarian workers and patrols in and around refugee camps and key cities by 21 to 25 per cent compared to earlier periods. On 1 July, the Government also launched a new system for the coordination of security patrols and escorts for humanitarian workers. This system, which is being established in 13 key locations in eastern Chad, will supersede the earlier coordination mechanism run by MINURCAT. The joint Chad-Sudan border force — whose headquarters are scheduled to move this month from El Geneina to Abéché — also continued to patrol along the border with a view to interdicting cross-border arms movement and banditry. This has resulted in an increase of cross-border trade and civilian population movement.

Following the spate of security incidents against humanitarians in June, President Déby replaced the Government of the Ouaddai region in Abéché. In July, the number of incidents decreased, also thanks to the start of the rainy season.

As far as the humanitarian situation is concerned, there have been encouraging reports of some returns of internally displaced persons (IDPs). The recent deterioration of the security situation in Darfur, however, has prompted new, albeit so far limited, arrivals of Sudanese refugees. Some 70 international humanitarian organizations continue to provide aid to the 255,000 Sudanese refugees and 168,000 internally displaced persons in eastern Chad, and to 64,000 refugees from the Central African Republic in south-eastern Chad. An estimated 150,000 members of the host population also received humanitarian assistance.

Since April 2010, humanitarian actors have reported a steady stream of returns in the Dar Sila and Ouaddai regions, estimated at 20,000 people. Time will be required, however, to determine how many of these returns represent permanent or seasonal movements.

Pursuant to resolution 1923 (2010), on 1 June the Government of Chad and the United Nations launched the Joint High-Level Working Group, chaired by the head of the Coordination nationale d'appui au déploiement de la force internationale à l'est du Tchad and composed of representatives of MINURCAT, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the Chadian security forces. The Joint High-Level Working Group has been meeting monthly to assess the situation on the ground with respect to the protection of civilians and the implementation of measures adopted by the Government towards implementing the tasks set out in paragraph 4 of resolution 1923 (2010).

In the meantime, MINURCAT continued to implement its mandate in the areas of the rule of law, including the provision of assistance and advice to the DIS and the justice and prison sectors in eastern Chad; human rights monitoring; and promotion and protection, with particular attention to sexual and gender-based violence. At the same time, it has produced plans to consolidate the gains achieved in these areas and to lay the foundation for their sustainability by the Government of Chad and its partners. In this regard, MINURCAT is discussing with the United Nations country team ways to help absorb some of the Mission's activities in the current planning processes, and particularly the early recovery plan for eastern Chad, on which the United Nations Development Programme is in the lead.

The sustainability of the DIS is an issue that will require sustained attention by the Government of Chad, especially given the short time remaining before MINURCAT's withdrawal. The Government and the United Nations have established a joint technical working group that has been working since June on a plan for the sustainability of the DIS.

MINURCAT, for its part, has already started activities towards the consolidation and sustainability of the DIS. Most of the construction projects in support of the DIS are expected to be completed by 31 December,

except the drilling of wells in the police stations, which can start only following the end of the rainy season in October.

As far as the Central African Republic is concerned, the Secretary-General has outlined in the report before the Council two options on how best to mitigate the impact of MINURCAT's departure from the north-eastern part of that country. The threat to civilians, IDPs, refugees and humanitarian workers in the north-eastern area remains real. The lack of sustained progress in combating security threats in north-eastern Central African Republic is mainly the result of the weak presence of its armed forces and the lack of logistical and other means from which it suffers.

In this context, the Secretary-General has presented two options to the Security Council. The first, as members may recall, provides for a United Nations peacekeeping force in north-eastern Central African Republic that would deter insecurity in the area and provide in extremis security and extraction for humanitarian actors until the Government has developed adequate capacity to assume this deterrent role. The Secretariat estimates that the deployment of approximately 1,000 personnel, military and civilian, would be needed. Preliminary estimates of the cost of the operation range anywhere between $98 and $122 million per year.

The second option would focus on strengthening long- to medium-term efforts in building the Central African Republic State capacities for security and the rule of law, coupled with immediate measures to strengthen the capability of the armed forces of the Central African Republic in the north-east. This option could be complemented by the deployment of joint border patrol forces between the Government of the Central African Republic on the one hand and those of Chad and the Sudan on the other, pursuant to agreements the Central African Republic signed with its neighbours some time ago.

Assistance for the strengthening of the Central African Republic's State and security capacity could be provided on a bilateral or multilateral basis, including through the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), with the support of the African Union (AU) and other regional implementing partners whose presence through the Mission for the Consolidation of Peace in the Central African Republic (MICOPAX) is, in reality, in the Central African Republic. In preliminary contacts with ECCAS and MICOPAX officials, as well as the AU, most of these interlocutors have expressed readiness to examine this option.

Yesterday, Mr. President, you had a chance to meet with Foreign Minister Antoine Gambi, who conveyed to you the position of the Government of the Central African Republic. This position was expressed to me in June by Prime Minister Touadera and, in July, confirmed to me by President François Bozizé, who reiterated that the preferred option for the north-eastern Central African Republic would be the one that builds the capacity of the Central African Republic security forces.

As noted in the Secretary-General's report, and based on his assessment of the situation and the position of the Government of the Central African Republic as stated above, the Secretary-General is of the view that the second option is the more appropriate course of action. He stands ready, of course, to lend his support. In this regard, allow me to add that the Peacebuilding Commission configuration on the Central African Republic could play a catalytic role.

Further to resolution 1923 (2010), MINURCAT has undertaken the planning necessary for the full withdrawal of its civilian and military components by 31 December 2010, and for the Mission's liquidation starting on 1 January 2011, unless the Council decides otherwise. In this connection, I wish to state that the initial drawdown of the military component was carried out in an orderly and secure manner. In that regard, I wish to express my appreciation for the cooperation MINURCAT has received from the Government of Chad. I would also like to express my appreciation to all troop- and police-contributing countries for their unfailing support to MINURCAT during this last phase of its mandate.

(*spoke in French*)

To conclude, I would like to underscore the three following points.

During the six weeks following the adoption of resolution 1923 (2010), the Government of Chad has spared no effort to gradually assume its responsibility for the protection of civilians. When necessary, vigorous action has been taken.

Secondly, the Détachement intégré de sécurité (DIS) has made considerable progress alongside the

other security forces in providing protection for the humanitarian space. However, a great deal remains to be done by the Government and MINURCAT during the Mission's final few months. Many challenges remain to be overcome. Ensuring the sustainability of the DIS will be a long and painstaking process that will require the full attention of the Government and its partners.

Thirdly and finally, an urgent solution will have to be found over the coming two months to fill the security vacuum following the departure of MINURCAT from the north-eastern Central African Republic.

The President (*spoke in Russian*): I thank Mr. Mahmoud for his briefing.

I now give the floor to His Excellency General Antoine Gambi, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Regional Integration and Francophone World of the Central African Republic.

Mr. Gambi (Central African Republic) (*spoke in French*): Allow me to express my great appreciation for the report of the Secretary-General (S/2010/409) on the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT), which was just introduced by his Special Representative for Chad and the Central African Republic. In follow-up to that report, I should like to underscore a few points that I consider worthy of clarification in order to reach a better understanding of the situation in the Central African Republic and of the legitimate expectations of the people and the Government of the Central African Republic regarding this peacekeeping force.

The current political situation in the Central African Republic is marked by preparations for the legislative and presidential elections that have recently been scheduled for 23 January 2011. As the Council is aware, these elections had initially been scheduled for the end of the first half of 2010. However, despite the firm commitment of the President of the Republic, His Excellency General François Bozizé, to organize the polling within the time frame set by the Constitution, it had to be postponed twice because of the scheduling of pre-election operations. These were disrupted by the delays in the drawing up of voters lists and in the implementation of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme, by the continuing climate of insecurity and, especially, by financial constraints.

Following the postponement, which was requested by our partners, by the political party of the democratic opposition and by civil society and armed groups, the National Assembly adopted constitutional legislation that extended the mandates of the President of the Republic and of Deputies until the next elections. This brought stability to the Central African Republic's institutions in the light of our country's recent history, the general environment and the geostrategic stakes of the conflict, including its well-known regional effects, in particular the crisis in Darfur and its impact on the Central African Republic. All of this has been compounded for over a year now by the presence in the Central African Republic of the Lord's Resistance Army rebellion, which kills, maims and rapes in the eastern part of our country along the border with the Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

I would recall here that the Central African Republic shares no border with Uganda. However, a Ugandan rebellion is currently taking place within the Central African Republic's territory, dealing the worst possible blow to our people and to the economy of our country.

The insecurity and instability in the north-east of the country led the Security Council to decide, through resolution 1861 (2009), to deploy the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad, in order to stabilize the region resulting from the long-term consequences of the political and military upheavals of the 1990s.

Now that the mandate of MINURCAT is coming to an end, there is a need to protect the future of this still precarious part of the Central African Republic, which could relapse into violence because of many destabilizing factors such as transborder insecurity, banditry, pockets of rebellion, interethnic conflict, the limited presence of defence and security forces and other emerging challenges.

MINURCAT's mandate was to secure the Birao area, bring limited patrols into that vicinity and protect humanitarian workers and evacuate them if necessary. There was honest cooperation between the Mission and the Central African authorities in discharging this mandate. My Government takes this opportunity to convey its heartfelt gratitude to all the countries that voluntarily and sincerely contributed to this peacekeeping force which truly eased the situation in

Birao and its surrounding areas, as well as in Sam Ouandja in northern Haute-Kotto.

The Mission has also been conducted in a transparent manner, thanks to the vigilance of the Secretary-General, who spared no effort to ensure implementation of the provisions of the contract. However, the announcement of the withdrawal of the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic, which will have dangerous consequences if we are not careful, has led to a strong response by the Government of the Central African Republic, whose entrenchment in that part of our country is not guaranteed due to the fragility and limited capacity of the security and defence forces.

Hence, a letter dated 15 February 2010 was addressed to the Secretary-General by the President of the Republic and head of State, His Excellency General François Bozizé, requesting advisers, trainers and observers from MINURCAT to assist the Central African Republic armed forces. We welcome with satisfaction paragraph 82 of the report of the Secretary-General, which takes account of the wish of the Central African Republic Government's wish to strengthen its security and defence forces in the north-east of the country — which is the soft underbelly of its territory, marked by permanent insecurity, given its geostrategic position — through the recommendation submitted for the consideration of the members of the Security Council, which my Government hopes to see adopted. What we wish is to have a strong, toughened, sustainable army of the Republic, capable of facing any possible situation.

For that reason, we seek supervisory assistance for the Armed Forces of the Central African Republic, training for the police and the gendarmerie, and follow-up on our equipment needs, including uniforms, clothing, bulletproof vests, vehicles, communication and transmission equipment, observation equipment and barracks.

The current period, which will extend through the end of 2010 and into the beginning of 2011, is especially vital for the Central African Republic. The withdrawal of MINURCAT, the transitional phase, the electoral deadlines, the post-election period, compounded by the referendum in Southern Sudan and by the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), are factors which should draw the international community's attention to the problems of the Central African Republic.

The primary responsibility for international peace and security lies with the Security Council. The Central African Republic cannot and does not want to fail, and it therefore counts on the proven support of the Council to meet the aforementioned challenges — and new ones as well.

A wise decision from the Council would be a great relief for us. For its part, the Government of the Central African Republic is already striving, through bilateral consultations, to reactivate agreements related to the joint transborder patrols. It intends to increase the number of the armed forces of the Central African Republic in the north-east to more than the strength of a battalion. For we face huge challenges if we are to protect Birao and its surrounding area, control the gangs of transborder bandits and poachers, ensure the security of refugee camps and control internally displaced persons, and especially combat the LRA rebel groups which have already reached the doorstep of the Vakaga region, to the north of Haute-Kotto.

In the coming weeks, members of the Economic Community of Central African States will engage in dialogue to gauge the possibility of making a contribution to the recommendation of the Secretary-General contained in his report. This recommendation is timely because it falls perfectly within the framework of the security sector reform that the Government of the Central African Republic has had some difficulty in launching owing to a lack of resources. It is also propitious in other ways, as the disarmament and demobilization programme has already started in the north-western region — which should also be the case in the eastern region, where it is proving very difficult to put an end to insecurity.

With a view to ensuring stability throughout our territory in order to enable the people of the Central African Republic to shoulder its civic responsibility, let me stress that the second option proposed by the Secretary-General should be urgently implemented in the coming days. This is urgent because we are approaching the 15 October 2010 date for the end of MINURCAT operations in the north-eastern Central African Republic.

If the principle of accepting paragraph 82 is established, it should be followed with immediate effects. For that reason, the Government is relying on the goodwill of the States participating in MINURCAT to provide it with instructors, appropriate supervisory

assistance and basic equipment for its security and defence forces. A price cannot be put on peace in an operation such as this, where the lives of thousands of people are in danger.

The President (*spoke in Russian*): I now give the floor to the representative of Chad.

Mr. Allam-mi (Chad) (*spoke in French*): At the outset, I should like to congratulate you, Sir, on your assumption of the presidency of the Council for the month of August. I should also like to welcome the presence among us of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Central African Republic and to reaffirm that my country fully shares his heartfelt concerns, stands steadfastly at his side and joins its voice to his in calling for the support of the international community.

With regard to the report of the Secretary-General (S/2010/409) introduced by his Special Representative Mr. Mahmoud, whose presence I welcome here today, I should like to say that it accurately reflects the reality on the ground and the concerns of various parties, including us and our humanitarian partners. We therefore welcome the high quality of the report.

We take this opportunity to stress that we have spared no effort to respect the implementation of the road map set out in resolution 1923 (2010) of 25 May. Above all, we wish to reiterate our commitment to protecting civilians, especially refugees and internally displaced persons, until their voluntary return to their places of origin. That will involve, without the shadow of a doubt, the Détachement intégré de sécurité (DIS) — an institution that, it should be recalled, was originally created by Chad, with the support of the Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees, then strengthened by the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT). DIS will need to be maintained and strengthened in terms of personnel, resources, and support for the Chadian security and defence forces. That is currently taking place and will continue after the full withdrawal of MINURCAT.

To give the Council an idea of the efforts we are making to ensure security in the eastern part of the country, I wish to underscore that approximately we are devoting $12 million of our own resources to that purpose each month. Furthermore, it is our hope that the international community will pursue its efforts to help ease our burden. Specifically, this will require the promised infrastructure to be provided to the benefit, of course, of DIS and our judicial and penal institutions. The trust fund must be maintained after MINURCAT's drawdown in order to meet the needs of DIS, which is a unique pilot force of which the United Nations and Chad should be proud. We have always said that it is a rather unique community police unit whose role on the ground is of major importance. It is only right to reaffirm our recognition of and gratitude to the generous contributors to the fund, and to call for these efforts to be kept up, with the encouragement of the Security Council.

In this regard, I cannot conclude my statement without informing the Council that the plan for the Chadian takeover of DIS, which was expected by the Security Council on 31 July, will be transmitted to the Council as soon as possible. We encountered a delay in awaiting some information from MINURCAT on its takeover of DIS to include in our report.

We have also taken due note of the concerns expressed and comments made by members of the Security Council in various settings, including informal meetings, and we will do our utmost to follow up on them accordingly.

Finally, we reiterate our full cooperation with the United Nations in the accomplishment of its noble peace mission in our country and the subregion.

The President (*spoke in Russian*): In accordance with the understanding reached in the Council's prior consultations, I now invite Council members to informal consultations to continue our discussion on the subject.

The meeting rose at 10.50 a.m.